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Abstract  
 
The technology to deliver mobile money services has been in place for over a decade, 
yet very few mobile money operations have reached scale. The purpose of the 
following research is to explore the possible reasons for this by analysing factors 
which impact the rollout and uptake of services. This is achieved through a case study 
of mobile money service offerings in the developing world in general and South 
Africa in particular. Findings of the research highlight the complexities of the 
challenge of reaching scale, particularly those relating to regulations, finding the 
appropriate business models and other socio-political factors. A further finding points 
to a possible lack of appropriate skills in the mobile money industry as a reason for 
services not reaching scale.  
 	   	  
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   3	  
 
Declaration  
 
I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and 
Development Management) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It 
has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University. 
 
 
 
 
Bronwen A Kausch 
19 October 2012 
 
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   4	  
Dedication  	  
 
For my children, Nicholas and Alexandra. Your love, patience and constant support 
have seen me through this journey. You have been gracious in your sacrifice and my 
completion is, in no small part, due to you both.  
 
To my mother Gloria, your belief in me has never waivered – even when mine did.  
 
To my father and brothers, you have all had a part to play and I am grateful for your 
long-distance support.  
 
To my dear friends, Claire, Lise, Gavin, Paul, Jason, Alastair, and Joy, thank you for 
your good-natured tolerance.  
 
To the late Professor Dirk Kunert, I remain forever indebted. 
 
To Hendrik, thank you for the music. 
 
 
 
“Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not 
the truth.”   
Marcus Aurelius 
 
 
 
 
 	   	  
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   5	  
Acknowledgments 
 
My deepest thanks go to my supervisor, Charley Lewis, who has patiently guided me 
through the research process. I am equally grateful to Luci Abrahams and the many 
lecturers at the LINK Centre who have inspired me to push past the boundaries of 
pedestrian thought. A special note of thanks to Will Hahn who, over the last six years, 
has shared his valuable insights and who remains endlessly positive about the future 
of South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Technology is a word that describes something that doesn't work yet.”  
Douglas Adams 
  
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   6	  
Table of contents  
Abstract	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  2	  
Declaration	  ...................................................................................................................................	  3	  
Dedication	  .....................................................................................................................................	  4	  
Acknowledgments	  ......................................................................................................................	  5	  
Table	  of	  contents	  ........................................................................................................................	  6	  
CHAPTER	  1	  Introduction	  and	  Background:	  The	  context	  of	  mobile	  money	  .............	  8	  
1.1.	  Introduction	  .........................................................................................................................	  8	  
1.2.	  Background	  ..........................................................................................................................	  8	  
1.2.1 The m-payment landscape	  ...........................................................................................................	  9	  
1.2.2 Regulating finance in a post sub-prime crisis environment	  ...........................................	  10	  
1.2.3 The business case for mobile money	  .....................................................................................	  12	  
1.2.4 Did they break the mould with M-Pesa Kenya?	  ................................................................	  13	  
1.2.5 Is South Africa immune to the sluggish uptake?	  ...............................................................	  14	  
1.2.5.1 Mobile Money landscape in South Africa	  .......................................................................	  16	  
1.3.	  The	  problem	  of	  mobile	  money	  ....................................................................................	  18	  
1.4.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  .......................................................................................	  19	  
CHAPTER	  2	  Literature	  review	  .............................................................................................	  21	  
2.1 Setting the scene	  ...............................................................................................................................	  21	  
2.2 What is scale?	  ...................................................................................................................................	  21	  
2.3 Finding the right metrics	  ...............................................................................................................	  23	  
2.4 How do regulations impact uptake?	  ..........................................................................................	  24	  
2.4.1 Regulating against risk	  ...............................................................................................................	  25	  
2.4.1.2 Regulating against Risk in South Africa	  ..........................................................................	  26	  
2.4.2 Regulating to protect the consumer	  .......................................................................................	  31	  
2.4.3 Regulatory overlap	  ......................................................................................................................	  34	  
2.4.4 Regulating for competition	  .......................................................................................................	  35	  
2.5.1 What does success look like?	  ...................................................................................................	  38	  
2.6 Social factors impacting uptake	  ..................................................................................................	  42	  
2.7 Conclusions and finding the research gap	  ...............................................................................	  44	  
CHAPTER	  3	  Research	  question	  and	  methodology	  ........................................................	  45	  
3.1 Research question	  ............................................................................................................................	  45	  
3.2 Methodology applied in order to answer the research question	  .......................................	  46	  
3.2.1 The argument for qualitative research	  ...................................................................................	  46	  
3.2.2 The argument for a case study	  .................................................................................................	  46	  
3.2.3 Research design	  ............................................................................................................................	  47	  
3.2.4 Research instrument	  ....................................................................................................................	  51	  
3.2.4.1 Designing the interview questions	  ......................................................................................	  51	  
3.2.4.2 Interview technique	  .................................................................................................................	  52	  
3.2.5 Challenges and limitations	  ........................................................................................................	  53	  
CHAPTER	  4	  Research	  findings	  .............................................................................................	  54	  
4.1 Getting to grips with the real motivators	  .................................................................................	  54	  
4.2 Getting money home still a big drawcard	  ................................................................................	  55	  
4.3 Remittance continues to drive growth	  ......................................................................................	  59	  
4.4 Over regulation stifling innovation	  ............................................................................................	  60	  
4.5 M-Pesa South Africa: playing for the endgame	  ....................................................................	  62	  
4.6 South Africa – a complex regulatory environment	  ..............................................................	  64	  
4.7 Is mobile money in South African designed for failure?	  ....................................................	  67	  
4.8 MNOs versus banks – a race to the bottom?	  ..........................................................................	  70	  
4.9 Demand driven growth the key to sustainability	  ...................................................................	  71	  
4.10 Skills are the real issue	  ................................................................................................................	  72	  
4.11 Regulating for financial inclusion	  ............................................................................................	  77	  
4.12 Interoperability the key for South Africa	  ..............................................................................	  80	  
CHAPTER	  5	  Research	  analysis	  .............................................................................................	  84	  
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   7	  
5.1 Scale – different metrics but vital none the less	  ....................................................................	  84	  
5.2 Regulatory challenges	  ....................................................................................................................	  85	  
5.2.1 Challenges to getting started	  ....................................................................................................	  85	  
5.2.2 Ensuring compliance brings new challenges	  ......................................................................	  87	  
5.2.3 Overlapping regulations adding to the administrative burden	  ......................................	  89	  
5.2.4 Regulating for competition or the lack thereof	  ..................................................................	  90	  
5.2.5 Summing up the regulatory environment	  .............................................................................	  92	  
5.3 How have the business models affected delivery and uptake of mobile money?	  ......	  93	  
5.3.1 Which business issues are affecting uptake?	  ......................................................................	  94	  
5.4 What other issues are impacting the uptake of mobile money services?	  ......................	  98	  
5.5 Research findings	  ..........................................................................................................................	  100	  
CHAPTER	  6	  Conclusions	  and	  areas	  for	  future	  research	  ...........................................	  103	  
6.1 To what extent have regulations impacted the rollout of m-money services?	  .........	  103	  
6.1.1 The cost of regulations on mobile money operations	  ...................................................	  103	  
6.1.2 Regulating for accessibility	  ...................................................................................................	  105	  
6.1.3 Regulating for trust	  ...................................................................................................................	  105	  
6.2 How have business models impacted the uptake of m-money services?	  ...................	  106	  
6.2.1 The cost of doing business	  .....................................................................................................	  107	  
6.2.2 The business of accessibility	  .................................................................................................	  107	  
6.2.3 The business of trust	  ................................................................................................................	  108	  
6.3 Other factors impacting the uptake of mobile money services	  .....................................	  109	  
6.3.1 How do skills impact the uptake of mobile money services?	  ....................................	  109	  
6.4 The assessment	  ..............................................................................................................................	  110	  
6.5	   Areas for future research and recommendations	  ............................................................	  111	  
6.5.1 Areas for future research	  ........................................................................................................	  111	  
6.5.2 Recommendations for m-money operators	  .......................................................................	  111	  
6.5.3 Conclusion	  ...................................................................................................................................	  112	  
CHAPTER	  7.	  References	  .......................................................................................................	  113	  
Appendix	  A	  Baseline	  questionnaire	  ................................................................................	  121	  	    
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   8	  
 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction and Background: The context of mobile money  
 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
The technology to deliver financial services, including banking and microfinance over 
a mobile device has been in place for over a decade, yet the uptake of these services 
to the financially disenfranchised remains comparatively low, and has certainly not 
met the bullish projections delivered by the industry ten years ago, as correctly noted 
by Boer and De Boer, (2010 p 10).  A second wave of mobile money pilots have 
occasioned scholars within e-development generally, and ICT for Development more 
particularly, to look closely at regulations, (both technical and financial) and to assess 
whether these are assisting or hindering the uptake of mobile financial services.  
 
The following research will outline how current regulations governing money transfer 
over mobile devices, and the business models which are used by companies providing 
the services, are affecting the rollout and uptake of financial services in the 
developing world, with particular reference to South Africa. In so doing, it will 
investigate how to speed up financial service delivery in developing countries in 
general, and in South Africa in particular.  
 
1.2. Background 	  
The terms m-banking, m-payments, m-transfers, and m-finance or m-commerce refer 
collectively to applications which enable users to use mobile devices to access and 
manipulate their bank accounts, store value in an account linked to their device, 
transfer funds, or even access credit or insurance products. (Donner and Tellez, 2008) 
 
David Porteous (2006) explains that mobile banking (as a subset of the larger 
category of electronic banking) can either be additive or transformational. Additive 
mobile banking, he explains, functions as an additional channel to existing traditional 
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banking channels. Transformational, however, targets customers who do not have 
access to traditional banking services.  
 
Mobile Money, or m-money, is a form of electronic money or a stored value which is 
used to execute payment over an electronic channel and using hardware (cellphones) 
or card-based mechanisms. (Alampay, 2010 p 3).  
 
The GSM Association has described M-money as:  
Services that connect consumers financially through mobile phones. Mobile 
Money allows for any mobile phone subscriber – whether banked or unbanked 
– to deposit value into their mobile account, send value via a simple handset 
to another mobile subscriber, and allow the recipient to turn that value back 
into cash easily and cheaply (GSMA, 2009. p 7) 
 
It is clear that no matter what the finer definition of Mobile Money, the ability to use 
a simple, ubiquitous device such as a cellphone to transact will bring with it distinct 
advantages to those who do not have access to formal banking services.  
1.2.1 The m-payment landscape 
 
More than half of the world’s adult population remain unbanked and the majority of 
those reside in developing countries (McKinsey & Company, 2009). However, a large 
number of those people without access to formal banking and other financial services 
have access to a mobile phone. According to the Mobile Money Union, the number of 
people who are unbanked, but have access to mobile phones stands at 1 billion today 
and is expected to grow to 1.7 billion by the end of 2012 (GSMA 2009). In fact, the 
mobile phone sim card penetration in South Africa, for example, is now at 101.1 
percent, and smart phones comprised more than half of mobile phones sold in in that 
country in 2009 (Gartner 2010). The ability to use these mobile devices to deliver 
services to communities outside the formal financial sector has also been repeatedly 
highlighted by the popular press.  
 
In 2009, expectations around the growth in mobile payments were high. Research 
company, Arthur D Little, forecast global m-payments to reach $250 billion by 2012, 
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growing at 68 percent per annum from a base of $29 billion recorded in 2008. (April 
2009). The company also suggests that cross-border mobile remittances are expected 
to grow by 146 percent per annum. The growth figures predicted in this field made it 
an attractive business to be in and many global financial and telecommunication 
companies were talking up the prospects as seen by the extensive coverage given to 
m-money by the popular press.  
 
From a government point of view, remittances make up a significant portion of the 
money flowing in and out of a country. Official figures from the World Bank show 
that remittance flows to developing countries reached $316 billion in 2009 and 
researchers expect this to grow by 6.2 percent in 2010 and 7.1 percent in 2011. (as 
cited by Ratha, Mohapatra, Silwal, 2010) 
 
The role of remittances in the economy is now being taken seriously, most especially 
since figures are showing that developing countries are receiving twice as much in-
bound remittance than official development aid (Comninos, Esselaar, Ndiwalana, & 
Stork, 2008). In fact, remittance is now being viewed by economists as a key means 
to meet external financing gaps. (Ratha et al 2010) 
 
However, the volume of remittances could be significantly more if the cost of sending 
money home by migrant workers was less, if the means to do it were simpler, and if 
the access to services were more available. (Comninos et al, 2008). 
 
Making use of mobile phones to conduct remittances makes excellent sense as it 
answers many of the problems described above. A key problem though, is that the 
flow of money – especially across borders – is a primary risk concern to governments. 
(Merritt, 2010. p 25) 
 
1.2.2 Regulating finance in a post sub-prime crisis environment  
 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the more recent sub-prime crisis a slew of 
financial regulations were issued which required financial institutions to be able to 
monitor the movement of money and who was moving it. Know Your Customer 
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(KYC) regulations became a requirement for countries which wished to adhere to 
global standards and which were serious about maintaining their trade relationships 
with the powerhouses of the West. (Johnston and Nedelescu 2005) 
 
Monitoring and controlling money was also used as key means to cut down on anti-
money laundering (AML) and together these Anti-money laundering / combating the 
finance of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws meant significant restrictions on who could 
handle money. The ensuing fallout of the sub-prime crisis saw the further tightening 
on how money changed hands. It also saw many countries enforcing stricter consumer 
protection laws.  
 
Perhaps an unintended result of this was a more complex environment for m-
payments. Harsher licensing requirements, stringent foreign currency laws, daily 
transfer limits and other requirements all made the rollout of m-payments more 
difficult as argued by Porteous (2006).  
 
The nature of financial services delivered over a mobile device, across networks, 
across sovereign borders makes the regulation of m-payments and mobile money 
exceptionally tricky, and researchers have acknowledged this, including Porteous 
(2006).    
 
The field of m-payments and m-banking is not only new and fast evolving but 
also sits at the overlap of several regulatory domains—those of banking, telco 
and payment system supervisors, and anti-money laundering agencies. The 
overlap substantially raises the risk of coordination failure, where legislation 
or regulatory approaches are inconsistent or contradictory (Porteous, 2006) 
 
Merritt argues that banking and technical regulators have been used to operate 
autonomously and that the cooperation to provide oversight of mobile money may 
well be a challenge, but will become increasingly necessary if we are to see a ‘risk-
based and proportionate oversight’ (2010 p 18). Indeed, the need for proportionate or 
balanced regulations is a common theme when assessing regulations. 
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1.2.3 The business case for mobile money 
 
Understanding the mobile money ecosystem first requires researchers to understand 
the players involved as well as their motivations.  
 
The business benefits for delivering mobile money services may be different for 
banks than for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). For MNOs, the ability to increase 
average revenue per user (ARPUs) is compelling. Dolan (2009) notes that ARPUs for 
mobile money customers are 74 percent higher than the non-mobile customers. He 
also notes that value added services such as these help combat customer churn.  
 
Banks, on the other hand, are seeing the benefit of using mobile as the means to reach 
the large numbers of unbanked individuals, and thereby increase their customer base.  
 
Today there are three commonly accepted broad business models used to deliver 
mobile money and simply described by Boer and de Boer (2010): The bank- centric; 
the mobile operator-led model; or initiatives in which banks and Mobile Network 
Operators (MNOs) team up and which are referred to as partnership-led models. Each 
of them has different technical and business challenges to overcome – not least of 
which are country specific regulations, as noted by Merritt (2010).  More recently, 
there have been a number of pilots where mobile payment solutions partner with the 
major card networks to add an additional level of functionality. The commonly held 
business models as noted by Boer and de Boer (2010) have also changed to 
accommodate joint ventures between MNOs and Banks to create hybrid models. 
(Alampay 2010) 
 
Whether led by a banking institution or a mobile network operator, mobile money 
services also rely on representatives within the community. The ecosystem should 
also include the agents who perform cash-in / cash-out services, manage account 
initiations including customer due diligence and, in some instances, even identify new 
applications.  
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Finally, as argued by Merritt (2010), ecosystem should also include Regulators, who 
create an enabling environment, protect the consumer as well as the financial system, 
complete the ecosystem along with the consumer or end-user of the services. 
 
1.2.4 Did they break the mould with M-Pesa Kenya? 
 
The M-Pesa product in Kenya has experienced rapid traction with the local 
community and in just four years reached 15 million users in a country with a 
population of a little over 40 million. (Tarrant, 2011) 
 
In October of 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed out that M-Pesa 
Kenya processed more transactions within the Kenyan borders than its global rival, 
Western Union, did across all its operational regions combined. Since its inception in 
2007 to March 2011, M-Pesa Kenya processed transactions worth Sh828 billion and 
Sh47 billion in 2010 alone. (Daily Nation, 2011)  
 
The success led to a number of duplicate initiatives, not least of which came from M-
Pesa parent company Safaricom which moved into Tanzania and Afghanistan. 
However, none of the impressive figures from its Kenyan counterpart where 
forthcoming and even the mainstream press began to question whether the company’s 
impressive local performance would be achieved anywhere else. (Tarrant, 2011) 
 
When examining the reason for M-Pesa Kenya’s success, industry commentators 
would sometimes point to the bouquet of factors which facilitated the growth of the 
product. Issues from the existing distribution network to the social factors were 
pointed out. Amongst these factors was the regulatory environment which existed at 
the start of the initiative in 2007.  
 
The overly-cautious, regulatory driven bank-led approach has all but killed off 
the possibility of producing an MPESA-like agile, cheap, customer-friendly 
mobile money application or solutions built around the requirements that sub-
Saharan African customers so desperately need. This has had profound effects 
on the pace of mobile money adoption. (Collins, 2011) 
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An argument put forward by Collins (2011) was that M-Pesa came into existence in a 
‘regulatory vacuum’ and that the service started operations without the need for a 
banking license. This allowed Safaricom to aggressively grow the service through its 
existing network of agents.  
 
It wasn’t long, however, before the local banks grew nervous and a year later the 
Central Bank of Kenya was lobbied to investigate M-Pesa. While the banks’ efforts to 
curb the mobile solution were not successful, it would set the scene for how banks 
initially viewed the mobile competition.  
 
Kenyan resident and technology commentator, Erik Hersman, points out that the 
reason why banks are so reticent about mobile offerings, is that they are quite simply, 
not able to compete. (Hersman 2010)  
 
At the time of publication, the costs of sending up to $500 on the M-Pesa platform 
was as little as 37 US cents. In addition, M-Pesa users could save up to $1000 on their 
account without incurring any additional bank fees. Hersman (2010) contends that 
banks simply cannot compete with this offering from Mobile Network Operator, 
Safaricom. He goes on to suggest that regulators are more effectively lobbied by the 
big banks and are naturally inclined to regulate in their favour.  
 
1.2.5 Is South Africa immune to the sluggish uptake? 
 
South Africa has been one of the early adopters when it comes to mobile technology – 
particularly in the m-payments field. (CGAP. b, 2011). It is also the home to a number 
of m-money development companies, not least of which is Fundamo, recently 
acquired by Visa for $110 million (ITWeb 2011). 
 
According to CGAP (b. 2011), the country has over 100 000 point of sale devices and 
close to 10 000 ATMs. The South African government has been committed to 
improving access to financial services, particularly for those who have historically 
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been denied access to financial services and which is evidenced in the country’s 
Financial Charter.   
 
Through the Charter, financial services companies in South Africa and other 
participants commit to inter alia:  
 
Actively promoting a transformed, vibrant, and globally competitive financial 
sector that reflects the demographics of South Africa, and contributes to the 
establishment of an equitable society by effectively providing accessible 
financial services to black people and by directing investment into targeted 
sectors of the economy. Financial Charter (2004) 
 
According to CGAP’s review of the South African banking sector (CGAP.b, 2011), 
around 63 percent of the adult population has access to a bank account through the 
formal banking sector. The Mzanzi bank account – a co-operative account between 
the country’s major banks and the South African Post Bank – was launched in 2004. 
While six million accounts were opened, CGAP reckons that many of these are now 
dormant.  
 
The South African Treasury released a policy document in February 2011, which 
sought to give clarity to the complex regulatory regime in South Africa. (South 
African National Treasury, 2011) 
 
While the national treasury acknowledged that proportionate regulation of financial 
access, (such as provided via mobile devices), was necessary, it went on to state that 
the risks of misuse of these payment services remained high and should remain tightly 
governed. Thus far, the only real concession made to better allow access to mobile 
money services by the poorer communities, has been the relaxation of the full KYC 
requirements for low-value transactions through a special dispensation under 
Exemption 17, under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act.  
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1.2.5.1 Mobile Money landscape in South Africa 
 
MTN and Standard Bank were the first to market in South Africa, launching what was 
then also one of the first global m-payments solutions in 2005. This was quickly 
followed by other solutions including Wizzit, which offered a mobile enabled bank 
account through its local banking partner, the South African Bank of Athens.  
 
Following the much referenced success of M-Pesa in Kenya, Vodacom launched its 
South African version of the service in 2010. This was achieved by using the banking 
license of local partner Nedbank.  
 
However, the uptake of mobile money services in the country has been less than 
stellar.  
 
MTN and Standard Bank invested around $80 million (CGAP. b, 2011) in their joint 
venture, but after struggling with KYC issues, the low uptake of the service saw the 
partners suspend the service in 2010.  
 
Subsequent to this, Standard Bank bought the MTN banking business from MTN and 
folded the MTN Mobilemoney account holders into the Standard Bank MobileMoney 
platform. MTN, meanwhile went on to launch PayD which is an e-commerce solution 
allowing online transactions using a pin-based debit card over the MTN Wireless 
Internet Gateway (WIG).  
 
In June 2011, Vodacom announced that it would be adjusting its marketing model 
when CEO, Pieter Uys, admitted that the South African M-Pesa service had “…failed 
to reach expectations and perform as well as it had in other countries, namely 
Tanzania and Kenya.” MyBroadband (2011). By June 2011, there were only 140 000 
registered users in South Africa. (Financial Sector Forum, 2011) 
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The service, which was launched as a joint venture between Nedbank and local 
mobile network operator, Vodacom in 2010, had focused its marketing attention on 
the low-income market, particularly black women in rural areas.  
 
The announcement came after Uys and his team had repeatedly avoided answering 
questions about the performance of the product after the release of Vodacom’s annual 
results in May 2011 leading to speculation that service was a “sinking ship” 
(MyBroadband, 2011).  
 
Research analyst, Arthur Goldstuck, commented that there were a number of reasons 
that M-Pesa South Africa would not attain the same level of success as its Kenyan 
counterpart. (Financial Sector Reform, 2011) These included: 
 
• The fact that Kenya had a high proportion of unbanked citizens compared to a 
largely banked population in South Africa 
• Safaricom was the only dominant MNO offering a mobile payment solution in 
Kenya, while there were a number of additive mobile banking services in 
South Africa 
• There is a culture of remittance usage in Kenya which is not experienced 
similarly in South Africa 
• There is a lenient regulatory framework in Kenya allowing Safaricom to easily 
and quickly sign up new members 
• Safaricom offered the service at a low cost making it more attractive  
 
 
It seems that not only are m-money projects in South Africa and other developing 
countries not reaching the user numbers originally forecast, but the intended profile of 
the user is not proving mobile payments the solution to financial disenfranchisement 
it was originally held up to be.   
 
The question on why this is the case becomes more important than ever. Is it the 
regulatory regime which is holding up user uptake – as suggested by those who argue 
for proportional regulation such as Porteous,(2009) Merritt (2010) and Alampay 
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(2010)? Or is it the business models which are unsuitable as pointed out by Mas and 
Radcliffe (2010)? Or, is it a combination of both? 
 
1.3. The problem of mobile money 
 
The business benefits for Mobile Network Operators, banks and third-party agents to 
increase their engagement within communities appear to be compelling. Boer and de 
Boer (2010) list 150 mobile payment initiatives and pilots in their market analysis, 
adding that more are being added every week. However, in the last two years, players 
in the mobile money space have begun questioning why the uptake and use of mobile 
money services have not been as successful as originally thought. Research houses 
such as Gartner (Moyer, 2010) and academics such as Mas and Radcliffe (2010), 
Porteous (2009) and others are pointing out that, even though the benefits of mobile 
money services for the previously financially disenfranchised are clear, there are very 
few of the many projects around the globe which are capturing the market they were 
designed to serve. Indeed, of the more than 150 payment initiatives referenced by 
Boer and de Boer (2010), only five have more than a million registered users. (Moyer 
2010) 
 
Given the apparent failure to reach scale of so many mobile money projects, attention 
is now being placed on how to reach the critical mass required to make mobile money 
services self sustaining.  
 
Despite progress over the last year, there is an acknowledgement that there 
are still too few successes at scale. Much remains to be done to reach critical 
mass, the point at which an industry has gained sufficient penetration for 
momentum to be self-sustaining. In the mobile money space, this will require 
both more customers and more transactions per customer. (Dolan 2009, pg10) 
 
Focus is now being placed on how mobile ecosystems can become more dynamic and 
productive. Issues of competition and interoperability of services are now a key 
requirement on the regulatory agenda (Dermish et al 2011). Proportionate regulatory 
approaches are being strongly advocated and debated (Lyman et al 2008).  
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Authors such as Mas and Radcliffe (2010) are investigating business challenges 
standing in the way of mobile money services reaching scale.  
 
Given the low uptake of services in countries such as South Africa, it becomes 
imperative to better understand the reasons behind the sluggish performance. This is 
of particular importance to policy makers and regulators, which are looking for ways 
to create an enabling environment and encourage financial inclusion in developing 
countries.  
1.4. The purpose of this research 
 
The purpose of this research is to critically examine existing mobile money 
implementations in developing countries, with a particular focus on South Africa. 
 
This will allow us to determine what business models are being used to deliver mobile 
money. I will examine how the models differ to those in other developing countries, 
particularly those in countries which are regarded as being successful, such as M-Pesa 
in Kenya, and how these have performed in relation to the South African initiatives.  
 
I will examine the business strategies of mobile money offerings which have been 
designed to overcome the ‘sub-scale trap’ as referred to by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) 
and assess their efficacy based on performance.  
 
In addition I will examine what regulatory environments are governing the delivery of 
mobile money. I will examine how these are impacting the rollout and delivery of 
mobile money services and how they are affecting the business models being used by 
service providers.  
 
Finally, I will examine other factors which may be hindering user uptake such as 
financial literacy, technical literacy and consumer awareness to ensure I have an 
holistic view of the mobile money ecosystem and all issues affecting it. 
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By conducting thorough research on the mobile money ecosystem in developing 
countries in general, and South Africa in particular, I will have a clear oversight of all 
aspects which may impact end-user uptake of services. Through this, and by 
identifying challenges and shortfalls in the regulatory environments, I will determine 
if current regulations are helping or hindering the rollout and uptake of mobile money 
services. It is only through an holistic oversight of the mobile money ecosystem and 
its drivers that I will be able to assess the extent of the effect of current regulations 
and if it is really these which are impacting the rollout and uptake of m-money 
services.  
 
 
The research is divided into the following parts: 
 
1. An introduction and background, mapping the mobile money landscape and 
outlining the issues affecting scale including a problem and purpose statement 
2. An in-depth view of what has been written on the topic through a literature 
review  
3. A research question to be applied to the research and the methodology used to 
investigate the question 
4. Findings of the research conducted 
5. A critical analysis of the research findings 
6. Concluding remarks including areas for further research and recommendations 
 
In accordance with the above structure, it is appropriate to begin the research with a 
thorough understanding of what has been written on the topic of mobile money and to 
assess which issues affecting scale have already been addressed.  
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CHAPTER 2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Setting the scene 
 
As more mobile money projects are rolled out across the globe, analysis of their 
performance is calling into question their sustainability.  Bullish projections in 2008 
and 2009 are being revised down (Gartner Dataquest, 2011), even for the developing 
world, once thought to be the region with the largest growth potential.  
 
The body of work on mobile money has shifted from focusing on the developmental 
and social benefits of mobile money (Pralahad 2006), to investigating what is required 
to increase user uptake, how policy makers and regulators can create an enabling 
environment, and how banks and mobile network operators should be addressing low 
user uptake as is seen in the writings of Mas and Radcliffe (2010), Heyer and Mas 
(2010) and others. 
 
When critically examining what factors impact the delivery and uptake of mobile 
money services, it is important to cover four areas: what constitutes scale and 
sustainability; how regulations impact user uptake; how business models are designed 
to encourage user uptake; and finally, what social issues may impact user uptake.  
 
This will allow us to better examine the challenges outlined in the problem statement 
and will facilitate a clearer understanding of what can be changed to encourage user 
uptake of mobile money services in the developing world in general, and in South 
Africa in particular. It will also highlight any research gaps in the current literature.  
2.2 What is scale?  
 
Some scholars, such as Mas and Radcliffe (2010), are examining why so few m-
money projects are reaching the scale required (such as the case with M-Pesa Kenya) 
to operate sustainably. In their paper, Scaling Mobile Money, (2010) these two 
authors argue that there are three business challenges which stand in the way of m-
money projects reaching scale: 
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The network effect – this states that the value of joining a network is directly 
proportional to those already on the network. In other words, it only becomes 
attractive to be on a payment network when your family, friends and business 
associates are themselves on the network.  
 
The chicken-and-egg trap – this is the challenge of growing network agents and 
customers in tandem. It is only an attractive business for a potential agent when there 
are customers to generate revenue. Similarly, it is only attractive to become a 
customer when you have convenient access to agents.  
 
Trust – like many new technologies, people will only sign on in numbers once they 
have heard from their peers that the service is trustworthy. Again, something which 
can only be attained through a sizeable user-base.  
 
Mas and Radcliffe (2010) refer to organisations which can’t overcome these 
challenges as being victim of the ‘sub-scale trap’.  
 
The risk of falling into this ‘sub-scale trap’ seems to be a very real one for some m-
money projects. In fact, global research house, Gartner, has revised its forecast for 
worldwide mobile payments through 2014 (Gartner, 2011) by 17 percent for both 
users and the number of transactions. The decline in growth came from the 
developing world, which had long been the focus of projected growth.   
 
Added to this decline in expected growth for the region is the conundrum of whether 
or not mobile money is actually achieving the developmental agenda of bringing the 
previously unbanked into the formal banking fold. Even the largest and frequently 
referenced success story, Kenya’s M-Pesa initiative, may not actually be contributing 
to the aim of bringing the previously underserviced into the financial fold.  For 
instance, by the end of 2009, 70 percent of registered M-Pesa users had already been 
part of the formal banking institution (Pickens 2009). 
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2.3 Finding the right metrics 
 
The definition of what constitutes success in an m-payment initiative may be different 
for different players. If one is speaking of users constituting scale then one can view 
the numbers quite simply.  
 
A Gartner report (Moyer, 2010) points out that only five m-payment solutions have 
achieved more than 1 million users in countries with a high percentage of unbanked 
citizens. It warns banks that they should not assume they can replicate the success of 
rollouts in Kenya and the Philippines (which form part of the ‘successful’ five).  
 
In theory, mobile sounds like the ideal technology to reach the unbanked. 
Mobile, through telco- initiated offerings, has been successful in reaching the 
unbanked in countries like Kenya and the Philippines. However, our analysis 
shows that few countries possess a similar set of quantitative metrics for 
successful rollouts of mobile payment initiatives targeted at the unbanked. 
Moyer (2010, p 3) 
 
Moyer applies four quantitative metrics which, if exhibited, will point to a higher 
chance of success for a mobile payment rollout.  
 
These are: 
1. A high mobile phone penetration 
2. A low banked population 
3. A high mobile phone penetration amongst the unbanked population and 
4. A high level of remittance activity (as a percentage of GDP) both within the 
country and across borders   
 
In each instance of success in the five countries, Moyer says remittance was the 
catalyst for mobile payment uptake – particularly amongst the large migrant worker 
force. These payments are made by urban workers, to their families in the rural areas, 
or across borders.  
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The report goes on to warn that while many countries may have some of the threshold 
metrics exhibited in the successful rollouts, few have all four. Moyer also warns that 
even if all four metrics exist, future mobile payment rollouts should not expect to 
reach these levels of success for some years after launch. In fact, the reports predict 
that: “Through 2012, 70% of mobile payment rollouts targeted at the unbanked will 
attain less than 1 million accounts.” Moyer (2010 p 3) 
 
Mas and Radcliffe (2010) argue that identifying the point of sustainability and critical 
mass is tricky.  
 
They believe scale and sustainability have been reached when two criteria are met. 
 
First, they suggest there should be at least ten times the number of outlets where cash-
in and cash-out services can be conducted than there are of traditional bank branches. 
They argue that this would offer compelling value for customers and would 
effectively overcome the challenges of physical proximity and access to services for 
the users.  
 
Secondly, they believe the scheme should generate at least 50 transactions per day, 
per outlet. In their view, this would sufficiently motivate the merchants to promote the 
service and, therefore, encourage organic growth.   
 
 
 
2.4 How do regulations impact uptake? 
 
Delivering banking to the world’s poor has been on the developmental agenda for 
many years. The financial difficulties of the poor have been described in depth by  
Collins, Morduch, Rutherford and Ruthven (2009), where the small, irregular and 
seasonal payments make financial security a lifetime challenge. For many years, 
banks argued that delivery to the under-serviced was too costly and not a mass-market 
proposition.  
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However, Mas (2011) challenges the proposition that the poor are too costly to 
service based on the low frequency and small value of their transactions. If this were 
the case, argues Mas, why do we see flourishing trade in small villages, where one 
can easily find products such as Coca Cola, cooking oil and even mobile pre-paid 
cards – all of which have a relatively low value?  Surely there must be a business 
benefit for the store owners and product manufactures to find a way to overcome 
physical and infrastructural challenges? Mas believes the problem lies with the 
operating model banks employ and their challenge of taking money from the physical 
and turning it into the electronic. This ‘last mile’ or infrastructure gap of reaching the 
end user in a profitable manner is being exacerbated by the regulatory requirements 
which govern how banks have to engage with the customers. (Mas, 2011) 
 
2.4.1 Regulating against risk  
 
The benefits of delivering financial services over a mobile device are far better 
understood than they were a decade ago as evidenced by the wealth of literature from 
authors such as Porteous, Mas, Merritt and others. Yet the economic environment has 
shifted since the launch of the first proof of concept pilots in 1999. We live in a world 
where governments are ever mindful that terrorism can best be controlled by limiting 
their access to finance. The US Department of State (INCSR 2008) commented that 
while mobile payments had a potential for good, there remained a serious risk that 
criminal and terrorist organisations would co-opt these services for their own means. 
The report bemoaned the lack of transparency in mobile money services and 
acknowledged that regulators where having a hard time responding to the rapid 
development in the m-payment field.  
 
There are already indications that money launderers and those that finance 
terrorism will avail themselves of the new m-payment systems. Responsible 
jurisdictions must find a balance between the expediency of m-payments, 
particularly in the developing world, and the need to guard against abuse 
(INCSR 2008 p 20) 
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The stringent Know Your Customer regulations as well as the AML/ CFT regulations 
in response to the sub-prime crisis and post-9/11 terrorism scares have placed a 
significant burden on organisations looking to deliver mobile money services to the 
developing world (Leyva 2008). A simple lack of infrastructure and basic utilities 
make customer registration and user validation tricky.  Authors such as Porteous 
(2009), Comninos et al, (2008) and Lyman, Pickens, and  Porteous, (2008) have 
warned that a proportionate regulatory approach must be adopted in order to ensure 
innovation is not sacrificed at the expense of regulating for risk. Alampay (2010) 
sums this up when he states:  
 
The challenge is striking the right balance where regulation does not hinder 
useful innovation and experimentation and permit branchless banking to 
expand and thrive, in other words introduce ‘proportionate’ regulatory 
policies. Alampay (2010 pg 3) 
 
2.4.1.2 Regulating against Risk in South Africa 
 
The South African regulatory landscape has generally been held up to be reflective of 
that of the developed world.  
 
In its country update, CGAP (a, 2011) notes that South Africa had some of the first 
mobile payment solutions in Wizzit and MTN Banking. The subsequent launch of the 
Nedbank and Vodacom joint venture, M-Pesa South Africa, has come at a 
‘challenging’ time, according to the report.  
 
Authors of the CGAP report believe the current regulatory environment to be marked 
by uncertainty. Know Your Customer regulations are strict, as are the exchange 
control money tracking requirements set up by the South African Reserve Bank. 
(CGAP, a 2011) 
 
CGAP (a, 2011) highlights that the South African government has tried to encourage 
banks to look more closely at financial inclusion as seen by the Financial Sector 
Charter (2004).  
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While the government itself has made use of branchless banking to reach the 
unbanked for the payments of social grants, the CGAP report questions the policy the 
government has created to enable more of these payment types. The report suggests 
the South African government has not provided total clarity for mobile money 
operators in the areas of AML/CFT standards and has restricted financial services 
exclusively to banks, discouraging new services.  
 
Several providers also report that it has taken them longer to launch new 
initiatives than they expected and that growth in number of customers is 
constrained by having to take a cautious interpretation of unclear regulations. 
CGAP (a, 2011 pg 5) 
 
Reaching the previously un- or under-banked population remains important for the 
government. Around a quarter of the adult population receive social grants, 
amounting to R88 billion per annum and going out to more than 14 million people. 
The government also pays around R2 billion purely in administrative fees to service 
providers which are involved in the grant payments, making it a lucrative business 
proposition for businesses in the space. (CGAP. a, 2011). The South African Social 
Security Administration (SASSA), which is responsible for the grant payments, has 
recognised that there is room for improvement, and has called for a strategic review in 
the payment solutions system.  
 
Until now, the South African government has relied on a stringent banking license 
regime to minimise risk.  
 
Primacy is given to banks and only banks registered under the Banking Act are 
allowed to function in the business of banking which includes taking deposits. 
Nonbanks, such as mobile network operators and other companies in the mobile 
money space can only offer branchless banking in partnership with registered banks. 
However, authors of the CGAP country review (a, 2011) believe the regulator has 
recognised the limits this places on nonbanks and have given credence to this in its 
new vision document (SARB, September 2011)   
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Under the National Payment Systems Act, nonbanks can only access the national 
payment and settlement system through joint ventures with banks. In theory, this 
gives the main banks in South Africa effective control of the national payment system, 
and is not good for competition. The Competition Commission in South Africa has 
already raised this issue and has recommended opening up payment schemes to 
nonbanks “in appropriate low-value or retail payment schemes” (Competition 
Commission 2008) 
 
Mobile money is also regulated in an additional three areas in order to minimise risk. 
These are the KYC standards, which govern documentation required when signing up 
for an account, the use of an agent outside of the banks’ branches and existing ATM 
infrastructure, and foreign exchange controls governing how money flows across 
borders.   
 
Know your customer  
South African regulators have made some attempts to ease the strict requirements of 
KYC standards. In 2004, the Ministry of Finance issued Exemption 17, which 
reduced the documents required to open account. For many South Africans, proving 
their permanent residence is particularly difficult and Exemption 17 aimed to allow 
those who could not find evidence of their residence, such as utility bill, to register for 
mobile money services. Exemption 17 also set the account balances and transaction 
limits in an effort to lower risk of criminal activity. However, this did not address the 
problem of moving money across borders for the large migrant worker force. CGAP 
(a, 2011) notes that the Reserve Bank and the Financial Intelligence Centre are 
looking at ways to free up the flow of money across borders with an exemption 
similar to that of Exemption 17.  
 
Building on Exemption 17, the South African Reserve Bank issued Circular 6 (South 
African Reserve Bank, July 2006). This allowed accounts to be opened without a 
physical verification, as required by Exemption 17. However, the relief given by 
Circular 6 was counteracted with even lower transaction limits. The South African 
government then went on to issue a further exemption to KYC requirements for 
prepaid offerings. The requirements are still fairly stringent though and monthly 
turnover cannot exceed R3000, the balance on the account cannot exceed R1500 and 
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no individual transaction can exceed R200. Moreover, no remittance of funds or 
receipts of cash or withdrawal of funds can take place. Effectively making the pre-
paid offering a purely cashless transaction medium.  
 
Agents 
Introducing third parties who handle money into the regulated environment adds an 
additional layer of complexity when it comes to risk.   
 
While there appears to be a fair amount of discretion for banks to use agents in the 
mobile money networks, the CGAP report of South Africa (a, 2011) suggests that 
there is not much in the way of regulatory guidance on how to apply flexibility. The 
report suggests that regulators are waiting for the service providers to give it 
suggestions on how regulations could be best applied to the use of third parties for the 
cash-in / cash-out services. The report references complaints by M-Pesa South Africa 
parent, Vodacom, which says the onerous requirements involved in registering a retail 
outlet has significantly impeded its roll out of services.  
 
Vodacom clearly feels the process of understanding what constitutes a 
permissible approach to the use of agents has slowed down the launch of M-
PESA considerably. Discussions with some banks revealed that, apart from 
the uncertainty around the broad regulatory space for agents, the 
accreditation requirements being set for agents under the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act also pose a problem. CGAP (a, 2011 
pg10) 
 
Cross border exchange controls 
South Africa has a robust exchange control and only a few organisations are allowed 
to deal in foreign currency. These institutions are required to adhere to a complex 
reporting system where each transaction is traceable and individually reported. This 
increases the cost of remittances and dissuades users from making use of the formal 
remittance methods, as pointed out in the CGAP report. (CGAP. a, 2011) 
 
KYC regulations can be restrictive and limit the uptake of financial services for the 
un- or under-banked as correctly noted by Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe (2010).  
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In their 2010 paper, Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe point out that regulators need to 
perform a balancing act when applying KYC regulations. Supplying the necessary 
documentation can be difficult, especially for those who do not have formal housing, 
may not have national ID documents or other means to verify their identity. The 
authors point out that these requirements may also add an additional layer of costs to 
mobile money services, making the service unattractive for banks chasing profit 
margins.  
 
For low value account and small transaction, the incremental costs of KYC 
procedures may be disproportionate to both the money laundering risks they 
purport to address and the value of these services to poor people. 
Consequently, they may entice customers to revert to informal money transfer 
and store of valuable solutions which operate outside of any regulatory 
constraints. Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe (2010, pg 8) 
 
The ‘regulatory balancing act’ lies in getting as many people onto an electronic 
money platform. Tracking money on an e-platform is, in theory, much more possible. 
Using some form of KYC in m-money systems also allows governments to know who 
is shifting money and to whom. The authors argue that by making KYC requirements 
too onerous, fewer people will join the formal money exchange mechanisms and 
governments will in fact push people into the informal financial sectors. It is the 
informal systems which cloak the nefarious activities of the criminal element. 
“Making transactions electronic increases the surveillance power of law enforcement, 
and enhances the ability of poor people to avail of financial services at lower cost,” 
they argue. (Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe 2010, pg 9) 
 
The strict regulations governing South Africa have not gone unchallenged. In a 
column based on a presentation he had just given at Tech4Africa on mobile banking, 
Ivo Vegter (Vegter, 2011) argues the real reason why South Africa endures such strict 
regulations is to afford the central bank greater control over the currency, and in so 
doing exercise it’s macro-economic policies.    
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The government wants control over monetary policy. It pays for overspending 
by devaluing the currency, using an ingenious trick known as "quantitative 
easing". You might recognise it as "printing money". If citizens are free to 
switch to a currency that keeps its value, government would not have this 
power…The result of all this over-regulation is a powerful banking cartel that 
doesn't even need to collude to skim the cream off the economy. (Vegter, 2011) 
2.4.2 Regulating to protect the consumer 
 
Branchless banking through mobile phones relies on a distribution model where third-
parties, or agents serve as the point of contact for the end-user or consumer. 
Regulators are keenly aware that this adds a layer of complexity to ensuring the 
protection of the consumer. Coupled with this is the fact that many of the under- or 
un-banked are less literate and therefore need to be protected. Dias and McKee (2010), 
warn that a balance needs to be struck. Regulators need to ensure the rights of the 
consumer are not compromised, that consumers are protected against unscrupulous 
agent activity, and that consumers are assisted to know their rights through 
educational campaigns. However, these requirements also need to be balanced with 
the need to create a business environment that still remains attractive to new entrants. 
Regulation, they argue, should obey two principles: proportionality and effectiveness. 
The ability to deliver new services through technological developments should not be 
impeded by over zealous consumer protection regulations.  
 
Porteous (2009) discusses the need to balance the protection of the consumer, with the 
ability to encourage the uptake of new financial services. He refers to this as the 
‘regulator’s dilemma’, which he highlighted first in his 2006 work (Porteous 2006). 
 
The case for consumer protection is plagued with the need to balance the lack of 
access to credit with the potential for consumer exploitation which may affect a much 
smaller portion of the population.  
Porteous highlights this by quoting a South African policy paper put out by the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 2005: 
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The credit market is not a risk free arena. There is considerable imbalance of 
power between consumers and credit providers, consumer education levels 
are frequently low, consumers are mostly badly informed about their rights 
and unable to enforce such rights through negotiation or legal action…Over-
indebtedness further has an impact upon the workforce, can lead to de-
motivation, absenteeism and even a propensity to commit theft. DTI Making 
Credit Markets Work, 2005 and referenced in Porteous July 2009 pg 4 
 
In an effort to protect the South African consumer from over-indebtedness, the South 
African government issued the National Credit Act with the formation of the National 
Credit Regulator to oversee the Act in 2005. The Act prohibits credit providers from 
creating reckless lending agreements and requires the service provider to conduct an 
affordability assessment of the customer. It is, however, left up to the courts to 
establish and enforce the definitions of reckless lending.    
 
The sub-prime crisis of 2008 was, according to Porteous, partly because of a failure to 
regulate. Policy makers and regulators are now forced to turn their minds to how to 
regulate to protect borrowers. However, inappropriate regulations stifle access to 
finance and can prejudice the poor.  
 
Porteous (2009), points out that the ability to legislate can exceed the ability of 
regulators to enforce the laws. When looking to create an enabling environment, 
which does not prejudice the access to credit, Porteous recommends that regulators 
look at a variety of options including self regulation, state regulation and as well as 
hybrids of these two. He believes a clear need exists for evidence-based decisions to 
be made before changes to policy and regulations are made and calls for a 
proportionate regulatory environment. He cautions developing countries against a 
rush to regulate based on “inappropriate norms from developed countries.” (Porteous 
July 2010, pg 2) 
 
When it comes to mobile money services, Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe (2010) point 
out that all existing mobile money deployments have some kind of bank interface 
since the electronic value of a customer’s money must be issued or backed by 
deposits in prudentially regulated banking institution. They highlight the importance 
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of banking transparency as it pertains to a bank’s assets (made up of illiquid loans) 
and the need for regulation around this. The issue of reckless lending – as highlighted 
by Porteous (2009) – arises when customer’s deposits are backed by risky loans. They 
put forward that there is no reckless lending, only reckless investment of the funds 
deposited.  
 
When outsourcing the function of cash-in / cash-out functionality to a third party, 
banks should retain the supervisory jurisdiction. By implementing a special licensing 
agreement for non-banks, which would only issue e-money or pre-paid cards in 
exchange for traceable cash, Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe argue the costs of creating 
these ‘narrow banks’ would be sufficiently low to be attractive to formal banks and 
other service providers. Since there would be no risky lending of the aforesaid money 
collected, there would be no inherent risk to the consumer and would serve as 
sufficient protection.  
 
In a focus note for CGAP on nonbank e-money issuers, Tarazin and Breloff (2010), 
examine the risks of nonbanks handling money, paying particular attention to 
developing world initiatives.  
 
Kenya’s M-Pesa highlighted the shift in the economic value chain when MNO, 
Safaricom became responsible for shifting sizeable portions of the country’s internal 
revenue over its networks.  
 
Tarazin and Breloff (2010) believe most regulators have addressed the issues of fund 
security by requiring nonbank service providers to maintain liquid assets equivalent to 
the total funds collected – this is know as an e-float. Safaricom places collected cash 
into a number of prudentially regulated banks in agreement with requirement of the 
Central Bank of Kenya.     
 
The funds which are collected are also regulated. The Malaysian regulator requires 
that funds are used for no other purpose than cashing out. Similarly, Tarazin and 
Breloff (2010) point out that the Philippines denies any extension of credit by 
nonbanks, removing the risk of intermediation by service provider that is not 
prudentially regulated.  
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   34	  
 
Spreading the e-float amongst multiple institutions also helps mitigate risk. The 
Afghan regulator requires not more than 25 percent of the e-float can reside with a 
single institution.  
 
Tarazin and Breloff (2010) point out a regulator also has to guard against possible 
claims against nonbank service providers. Should the operator face legal claims 
against it, customers may be at risk from claimants against the operator. To overcome 
this, M-Pesa Kenya has moved to protect customers by ring fencing its e-floats 
through a trust account managed by third-party trustees.  
 
Finally, Tarazin and Breloff (2010) argue that having significantly different 
regulations for nonbanks may disadvantage banks, but go on to point out that policy 
makers and regulators need to create rules which mitigate risks for customers, but do 
not stifle “the dynamism, creativity and potential of these new actors,” (2010 pg 5).  
 
2.4.3 Regulatory overlap 
 
Mobile Money straddles several regulatory domains and therefore there is an 
increased risk of co-ordinated failure (Porteous 2009). For example, in South Africa, 
customers are required to register for both SIM cards and cellphones (Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act, RICA) and when opening a banking account (Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act, FICA).  The information required for both are exactly the same and 
authors are questioning whether this could not be facilitated through better data-base 
interoperability (Alampay 2010). In fact the more recent trend in regulation is to find 
commonality to between regulations and look for ways to streamline these for better 
efficiencies. Alampay (2010) argues that by increased focus on overlapping issues 
concerning banking and telecommunication regulators, such as system 
interoperability, universal access and consumer protection, we stand a better chance 
of avoiding co-ordination failure and stimulating technical innovation and, ultimately, 
encourage uptake.   
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2.4.4 Regulating for competition  
 
Interoperability is not limited to technical systems being able to work together. It is 
also an important aspect in user behaviour and can refer to networks being able to link 
together to allow users to switch between MNO service providers or banks. (Dolan 
2009). Interoperability is currently fairly limited with user lock-in to service providers 
and products the norm. Interoperability is increasingly being recognised as a key 
driver of user uptake and, Dolan and others believe it could assist in mobile money 
services reaching critical mass. MNOs and banks have tried to hold onto their first-to-
market advantage by denying access to their networks to new entrants. Balancing 
competition and interoperability is therefore another regulatory conundrum which 
should be critically assessed for future researchers – as noted by Dolan (2010), 
Lyman et al (2008) and others.  
 
In South Africa, the South African Reserve Bank is beginning to analyse the influence 
of interoperability. A positioning paper published in January 2011 states that 
interoperability is a principle which should be sought and maintained wherever 
feasible in the local payment system. (CGAP. a 2011)  
 
The Reserve Bank is looking to benchmark local regulations to those internationally 
and has called for a move away from proprietary to open standards and to actively 
discourage the development of closed-loop payment systems. The challenge ahead of 
the Reserve Bank is not a small one. SARB is aware of 120 bill payment providers 
and is responsible for their supervision under Directive 2/2007 to the National 
Payment System Act of 1998. (CGAP. a, 2011) 
 
2.5 How do business models impact uptake?  
 
Mobile phones have been the focus of volumes of literature in the ICT for 
development field. The ubiquitous, reasonably affordable, mobile device has been 
looked at to help improve the lives of the most vulnerable communities. The advent of 
the simple, fast, payment methods and the ability to store value in an account 
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associated with a mobile device occasioned many works on how mobile money 
services would bring the previously un- or under-banked population into the financial 
fold.  
 
Heyer and Mas (2010) believe this potential of mobile phones to ‘revolutionise’ 
access to finance has been brought to the fore by the success of M-Pesa Kenya. 
However, they point out that the apparent difficulty of other markets to show the same 
success suggests that some markets and social environment may be more receptive to 
this kind of innovation than others.  
 
Heyer and Mas correctly point out that M-Pesa Kenya was certainly not the first 
sustainable mobile money operation. Smart Money in the Philippines, launched in 
2001, holds that honour. M-Pesa Kenya, however, has set precedent when it comes to 
the speed of user uptake.  
 
While Heyer and Mas (2010) acknowledge it is particularly difficult to fully 
understand why no other m-money project has reached the scale of M-Pesa Kenya, 
they put forward a framework to assess the business models by analysing various 
business characteristics.   
 
The authors believe business models require three key characteristics: 
 
‘Volume’ – m-money transactions are generally low-value. For this reason, a business 
operating an m-money service will need to capture a large number of transactions to 
make their business sustainable.  
 
‘Speed’ – operators need to ensure they reach as many possible customers as quickly 
as possible in order to sign them onto the service and get money flowing through the 
systems.  
 
‘Coverage’ – a key selling point for mobile money is its ubiquitous nature. Being able 
to send money anywhere, anytime is more than just a marketing ploy. Operators have 
to support their claims and this means a coordinated roll-out across an entire country.  
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These three aspects can be seen in relation to Mas and Radcliffe’s work (2010) when 
they examined the challenges of reaching scale.  
 
To add to the operators conundrum, Heyer and Mas (2010) point out that the need for 
volume, speed and coverage depends on the business model being scalable. As more 
users sign up, the service must be able to support them.  
 
Heyer and Mas (2010) go on to determine the potential for scale by analysing a 
market’s environment according to five, logical factors: the regulatory environment, 
the existing retail landscape, the mobile phone landscape, the competitive landscape, 
and the latent demand for the services.  
 
The regulatory environment of a potential market would take into account the ease of 
setting up a mobile money business, the need and degree with which operators would 
need to partner with banks, foreign exchange laws, KYC and AML/CFT requirements, 
security and consumer protection laws. This is well documented by authors such as 
Porteous(2009), Merritt(2010) and Alampay(2010).  
 
The retail landscape has a direct impact on the operator’s ability to set up its cash-in / 
cash-out network. Making use of a government’s existing network through post 
offices may be an option, but tapping into the formal and informal trading network is 
essential to ensure distribution. Heyer and Mas (2010) point out that in many 
instances, an existing airtime reseller network is used as the starting point for more 
successful m-money initiatives.  
 
Mobile phone penetration is an obvious prerequisite. In countries where there is a 
poor mobile phone penetration, the benefits of transacting over a cellular phone is 
moot. Similarly, decent cellular network coverage is essential. The pricing models of 
the cellular operators is also important. Heyer and Mas (2010) point out that the 
success of the Smart Money initiative had a lot to do with the fact that the population 
used SMS all the time and at a very low cost. The jump to using text for an additional 
and beneficial service would not be a large one and would be obvious to potential 
customers.  This point of view is strongly supported by Moyer (2010) who place high 
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mobile penetration as the number one requirement on the scale of metrics for success 
of mobile money payments.  
 
When looking at scalability in the mobile markets, Heyer and Mas (2010) believe that 
mobile network operators which have a dominant market share are in a prime position 
to quickly grow their m-money offering. Issues like market penetration, brand loyalty 
and trust are often already addressed in instances of market dominance.  
 
Issues around existing alternatives or competition are a real conundrum for operators. 
Heyer and Mas (2010) point out that demand-side indicators should be reviewed in 
context with what already exists in the market under review. If there are already m-
money operators in the market, it may be difficult to convince consumers to switch. If 
the operator is first to market, however, they face the challenges of convincing 
consumers to try out an unknown service. In this instance, we can see the challenges 
highlighted by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) where they describe the chicken-and-egg 
scenario – ie, customers will only join an m-money initiative when their family and 
friends are on board.   
 
The final factor Heyer and Mas (2010) examine is latent demand. When M-Pesa 
launched in 2008, Safaricom used the simple ‘send money home’ proposition. This 
was a key motivator for the large migrant workforce sending money from the urban 
areas back to their families in the rural areas.  
 
Remittances have been a key driver in the uptake of mobile money services. Moyer 
(2010) refers to the importance of remittances and how they have been the catalyst for 
user uptake in the five successful mobile money projects which have reached scale.   
 
2.5.1 What does success look like?  
 
The case for remittances driving m-money uptake is highlighted perfectly by the 
Vodafone Qatar case study produced by implementation partner, Fundamo.  
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According to the case study (Fundamo 2012), more than 80 percent of people living 
in Qatar are migrant workers. Allowing this vast group of users to send money home 
to the Philippines, India, Nepal and Pakistan, where the majority come from, was a 
clear win for Vodafone.  
 
Another key attribute for success, as referred to by Heyer and Mas (2010) and Moyer 
(2010), is the high mobile penetration in Qatar.  In 2011, mobile penetration was 
estimated to be at 322.52 percent – more than three sim cards per person in the 
country.  
 
The Qatar success for Vodafone did, however, step outside the framework outlined by 
Heyer and Mas (2010) in that Vodafone was competing against a national incumbent 
which had a dominant market share. The answer lay simply in delivering an effective 
and cost efficient international remittance offering with all the major home countries 
of the migrant workers.  
 
This did not mean that there weren’t challenges. The case study (Fundamo 2012) 
shows that issue around interoperability had to be addressed in order to integrate with 
the multiple payment clearing houses in multiple countries. Strict KYC requirements 
came down the regulatory line in 2010, in the middle of the technology build and 
Vodafone’s instance that they had a single sign-on (SSO) added to the technical 
challenges. Multiple language options and a simple user interface were required to 
make the experience a simple and successful one for potential customers.  
 
All this was exacerbated by the need for a rapid, country-wide rollout of services – a 
requirement fitting into all three characteristics of success outlined by Heyer and Mas 
(2010) volume, speed and coverage.  
 
At the time of the launch, Vodafone Mobile Transfer claimed to be the first 
international mobile remittance service. Within eighteen months the service had 
signed up 38 percent of the Qatar cellular owners as customers, despite the continued 
competition of the long-time incumbent.  
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The most often referenced success story and the benchmark for what a sustainable m-
money project looks like, has to be M-Pesa Kenya.  
 
In their analysis of the M-Pesa Kenya initiative, Mas and Morawczynski (2009) point 
out that M-Pesa Kenya parent company, Safaricom’s market dominance has played a 
key part in its success.  It’s market share dominance (around 77 percent in 2009) and 
its strong brand presence helped in the user uptake.  
 
Safaricom went to market with a simple message which clearly defined the value 
proposition of the service. The marketing was aggressive and the Safaricom team 
focussed almost entirely on the remittance service as the ‘killer app’ for the service. 
Again, this fits into the success pre-requisites highlighted in latter writings by Heyer 
and Mas (2010) as well as Moyer (2010).  
 
The service offering was simple to use and Mas and Morawczynski highlight the 
simple user interface, the fact that the applications sits on the mobile device and 
launches from the phone, as well as the step-by-step transactional process. This 
simplicity was necessary to allow even the most unsophisticated technology user to 
engage successfully with the product.  
 
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   41	  
 Figure 1. M-Pesa Kenya Menu structure to initiative a transaction 
 
Agents make up a key part of the m-money ecosystem. Mas and Morawczynski 
(2009) maintain Safaricom exercised tight control of its agent network. The MNO 
signs exclusive agreements with its agents and demands prominent branding on their 
premises. Safaricom has ensured there is consistency in user experience no matter 
which agent is used across the country.  
 
A simple sign-up process has been structured to encourage uptake, with the agent 
doing most of the paper work. KYC requirements are nothing more than an ID 
number which is verified by the agent against the original.  
 
Agent incentive fees were fairly high at the beginning of the project to encourage 
quick adoption. This was done to overcome the ‘chicken-and-egg’ challenge as 
outlined by Mas and Radcliffe (2010).  
 
M-Pesa Kenya kept fees low and there was no increase in fees for the first two years 
of operation – also in an effort to reach scale as quickly as possible.  
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Other incentive to encourage uptake was the fee structure between users and non-
users. Customers pay almost triple the fee to send money to a non-customer, but the 
recipient can cash out the money at an agent for free. This put pressure on signed up 
customers to encourage their friends and family to join the service. It also ensured that 
the first-time experience for non-users was a good one.  
 
The South African M-Pesa offering in contrast is not nearly as compelling. Ivo Vegter 
(Vegter, 2011) contends the financial offering laid out by the banks in South Africa, 
including M-Pesa South Africa, is simply not compelling. As of September 2011, 
MTN Banking was charging Transfers costs of R3, withdrawals cost of R5, and 
deposits cost customers 1 percent of the monies deposited with a minimum of R3. 
Similarly the costs of M-Pesa South Africa are not cheap, according to Vegter. Users 
are charged R2.45 for a transfer to another M-Pesa customer, and R10 for sending 
money to a non-customer. Vegter contends that the pricing models used are not 
geared to the target market, arguing that a more attractive option would be to use as 
sliding scale, and for lower transaction values to attract a similarly lower fee. (Vegter, 
2011) 
 
Mas and Morawczynski (2010) contend that it was Safaricom’s control of the entire 
ecosystem, from start to finish, which allowed it to reach scale so quickly. When 
analysing the business model outlined by Mas and Morawczynski, it is clear that the 
challenges of the ‘sub-scale trap’ referred to by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) were 
overcome.  
 
 
2.6 Social factors impacting uptake 
 
According to the most recent reports from FinMark Trust (2011) the level of adult 
South Africans who were financially excluded actually increased from 2010 to 2011. 
In 2010, 23.4 percent of adults were financially excluded, compared with 27 percent 
in 2011. The survey suggests that South Africans are concerned the costs of banking 
and financial literacy and awareness of alternate products was lacking. The survey 
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went on to confirm that attitudes and perceptions towards financial institutions could 
be the barrier to user uptake.  
 
Founder of Emerging Futures Lab, Niti Bhan, has written extensively about delivering 
services to the economically disenfranchised in the developing world. The Bottom of 
the Pyramid, as this demographic is know, have particular needs which should be 
taken into account when delivering new products. In a blog (Bhan, 2009), Bhan puts 
forward five key issues companies should take heed of when entering developing 
markets and trying to reach the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) markets.  
 
Bhan argues that companies need to meet an unfulfilled need in the BoP markets if 
the potential customer is to part with their hard-earned cash. She puts forward a 
framework of five ‘Ds’ which define the needs of the user: 
 
• The product should contribute to the ‘development ‘of the economy and 
society if it is to fulfil a meaningful need.  
• The product should be well ‘designed’ and contextually relevant – and of 
course, affordable.  
• The product should be easily accessible and therefore will rely on solid 
‘distribution’ 
• There should be an existing ‘demand’ for the product, or the ability to create 
the demand 
• The poor are not looking for handouts, but opportunities and therefore the 
product should be mindful of the potential consumers’ ‘dignity’.  
 
Bhan’s propositions in her blog (2009) are not dissimilar to the findings of the 
FinMark Trust Survey (2011). The report calls into light three interventions required 
to correct the lack of uptake of financial products in South Africa.  
 
The need to build capacity through financial literacy campaigns. This can be aligned 
with Bhan’s call for demand which could be created through the literacy campaigns, 
as well as her call for dignity as the poor seek to uplift themselves.   
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Providing financial products that meet specific needs. This can be aligned to Bhan’s 
(2009) call for appropriate design of products.  
 
The FinMark Trust survey finally calls for the removal of barriers to access of 
products, in particularly regulatory barriers. This would align with Bhan’s (2009) call 
for development since appropriate regulations would ultimately have social and 
economic goals as their objective.   
 
2.7 Conclusions and finding the research gap 	  
In conclusion, as the body of literature around mobile money grows, a more thorough 
understanding of the drivers is emerging. However, despite the works being produced 
for, and read by, regulators and industry players, the continued lack of m-money 
projects reaching scale suggests that there is still much to learn.  
  
Indeed Dermish, Kneiding, Leishman, and Mas, (2011), acknowledge in their mobile 
banking literature review, that there is a gap in literature focusing on the incentives 
which drive the various players in the mobile money ecosystem, and that while there 
is not likely to be a unique model that balances these interests from country to country, 
only by understanding their commercial interests and competitive advantages, will we 
be able to find a ‘ubiquitous’ retail option that delivers to scale.    
 
Based on this research gap, the following section outlines the appropriate questions to 
be applied to better understand the problems of m-money services and to fulfil the 
requirements set out in the purpose statement.   
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   45	  
CHAPTER 3 Research question and methodology 
 
3.1 Research question 
 
In response the literature review and the research problem, this study focuses on what 
it takes to increase the end-user uptake of mobile money services in the developing 
countries with particular focus on South Africa. It also questions the business models 
being used to roll out services and question if these are the most effective in order to 
reach the scale required to make them sustainable and, if not, how regulation can be 
better applied to encourage a robust and competitive ecosystem.  
 
This is achieved by asking a key question:  
 
What factors impact the delivery and uptake of mobile money services in 
developing countries, particularly in South Africa?  
 
To fully answer this question, three sub-questions are addressed: 
1. Are current regulations helping or hindering the uptake of mobile 
money services in developing countries and South Africa in particular? 
2. Are the business models currently being used appropriate to deliver 
services at scale?  
3. Which other factors impact the user uptake of mobile money services? 
 
By answering these questions we have a better understanding if it is regulation which 
is impeding rollout and uptake of mobile money services, or, if it is the business 
models being used which are not geared properly to deliver. Through an analysis of 
the business models we can better understand the commercial interests and 
competitive advantages of the initiatives and thereby address the research gap 
highlighted in the literary review. This in turn may assist regulators develop an 
appropriate regulatory toolkit which answers Dias and McKee’s (2010) call for a 
balance between regulation proportionality and efficacy.   
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3.2 Methodology applied in order to answer the research question  	  	  
In this section I establish the steps required to fully answer the question outlined in 
research question and sub-questions. This will look at the body of work governing 
methodology to ensure the most appropriate method has been used.  It will also 
include a detailed account of which candidates were chosen to be interviewed with 
reasoning as well as documenting the interview process. Finally, it will examine the 
challenges and limitations of the research instrument.  
 
3.2.1 The argument for qualitative research 
 
In order to appropriately investigate the complex issues of regulation and business 
models used to deliver mobile money services in developing countries I have made 
use of qualitative research.  As Marshall and Rossman (1999, pg.22) point out, 
research can be likened to the detective work of Sherlock Holmes or investigative 
reporting. The authors suggest that through qualitative research, curious or anomalous 
behaviour or phenomenon are examined and attempts are made to explain these. In 
this instance, I attempt to explain why mobile money initiatives in developing 
countries have not reached scale. The process of investigation will also rely on 
supporting data, such as the figures pertaining to service uptake, the number of bank 
accounts and mobile phones per capita etcetera. This quantitative data will be used to 
add context and to support assumptions relating to the greater challenges outlined in 
the problem statement and the research question.  
 
3.2.2 The argument for a case study  
 
According to Yin (1984) case studies are used when trying to answer the “how” or 
“why” questions in research. In this instance, the research is investigating how 
regulation is impacting business models of mobile money, as well as why existing 
implementations are struggling to reach scale. The case study is also considered 
appropriate when an holistic and in-depth investigation is desirable (Tellis, 1997 
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unpaginated). In the same work, Tellis also argued that case studies are “multi-
perspectival analyses”.  
 
In keeping with what Tellis suggests, and in order to fully understand why mobile 
money initiatives are not reaching scale, I have investigated a number of role players 
in the mobile money ecosystem. Some are in the business of delivering mobile money 
services and have a keen sense of the challenges facing the industry. Others are 
analysts who critically examine the mobile money industry and therefore have a broad, 
top-level view of the industry, but from the outside. Others are involved in the 
creation of the regulations which govern the industry and will be able to shed light on 
the challenges facing regulators. A cross section of interviewees will ensure a broad 
understanding of the challenges and opportunities are facilitate a more holistic view 
of the ecosystem and therefore a more comprehensive assessment.  
 
3.2.3 Research design  
 
I have conducted a case study of the mobile payment ecosystems in developing 
countries, paying particular attention to South Africa. I have compared the South 
African environment to that of the Kenyan and other developing countries’ 
ecosystems. This gives granular insight into the various business models being used 
and how they have been set up to deliver within the current regulatory regime in 
South Africa.  
 
As Yin (1984) and Tellis (1997) point out, a case study requires the collection and 
analysis of secondary data. This will give context to the case study and help formulate 
the questions when gathering information for the primary data.   
 
Semi-structured qualitative interviews, using open-ended questions were used to 
gather primary information.  
 
The case study is based on document analysis including financial results, annual 
reports, published news articles, existing case studies conducted by other researchers 
and other work made available by companies working in the field of m-payment.  
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With this as the baseline context, I conducted semi-structured open interviews with 
the following individuals: 
 
Mark Taylor: After the success of its namesake in Kenya, many expected the M-
Pesa South Africa to achieve a similar status. However the project has yet to reach 
scale MyBroadband (June 19, 2011). I secured an interview with Mark Taylor 
Executive Manager of Vodacom M-Pesa. This has allowed me access to the highest 
level of insight at the company. Taylor was able to speak freely about both the 
challenges faced up until now as well as the company’s plans to address these issues 
going forward. He has first-hand knowledge of the regulatory challenges and business 
drivers and limitations.  
 
Hannes Van Rensburg: Established in 1999, Fundamo has developed the back-end 
solutions which have been used in 50 deployments across 20 countries. The company 
has also been involved in the implementation with strategic partners and therefore 
staff at the company have key insights into the regulatory environments across the 20 
developing countries.  
 
I secured an interview with Fundamo founder and CEO, Hannes Van Rensburg. This 
allowed me question Van Rensburg on a range of issues including his experience with 
companies which have overcome regulatory and business challenges to implement 
successful projects. Van Rensburg has also seen how projects can fail and has an 
insight into the negative aspects facing mobile money as well as the insight of 
mistakes that have been made. Over a decade working in the mobile money industry 
qualifies Van Rensburg as an industry expert.   
 
Gavin Krugel: During the interview with Van Resnburg, the Fundamo CEO 
suggested that recent appointee, Gavin Krugel would be in a position to give 
particular insight into the regulatory environment. Krugel is the Chief Customer 
Strategy Officer at Fundamo. Previously he worked as a Senior Director at the GSM 
Association. This experience has afforded Krugel a deep insight into the global 
mobile money market and allows him to comment on the South African market from 
this international context.  
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Dave Mitchell: The South African Reserve Bank is responsible for the oversight of 
key financial regulations affecting mobile money in South Africa. As the head of the 
National Payment System Department, Dave Mitchell has been personally involved in 
much of discussion and creation of the regulations pertaining to mobile money. 
Mitchell works closely with companies involved in mobile money industry, 
consulting with them and hearing their frustration, suggestions and concerns. Mitchell 
also works closely with the banks and therefore has an excellent perspective of all the 
industry players.  
 
Ernst Janse Van Rensburg: Ernst Van Rensburg is the Forex Managing Director, 
Africa and Asia at the Sable Group. Ernst Van Rensburg has a good understanding of 
how money moves across borders, and the regulations which govern the flow. 
Remittances have been isolated as key driver for mobile money uptake and the 
impacting this service is of interest when assessing the mobile money space.  
 
Rob Burrell: Ernst Van Rensburg suggested I interview Burrell based on his intimate 
knowledge of the mobile money space as it pertains to remittances. Burrell is 
Managing Director of Mukuru.com which specialises in moving money across 
borders over mobile devices and the Internet.  Burrell has been involved in the 
company since inception six years ago. In that time he has worked with central banks 
and regulators across the globe to ensure the company meets the compliance 
requirements in each region. This gives Burrell insight into the regulatory challenges 
and how they have impacted businesses.  
 
Gary Collins: Consulting to mobile network operators in the Sub Saharan region has 
given Collins excellent insight into the business models of the operators. He is has 
helped design mobile money strategies for MNOs and, based on his published works, 
I knew he had strong views on regulations and how they impact the uptake of mobile 
money services.  
 
Ewan Sutherland: An independent telecommunications policy analyst and adjunct 
professor at the University of Witwatersrand, Sutherland is ideally positioned to 
comment on the mobile money ecosystem. He has published multiple works on the 
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mobile telephone industry and has access to a wide range of information from the 
entire telecommunications space. Sutherland has lectured at the LINK Centre and I 
was certain of his knowledge and interest in the field of research.  
 
Steve Esselaar:  The principle telecommunications consultant at Intelecom in New 
Zealand, Esselaar is a South African expat with a deep understanding of the South 
African policy and regulatory environment. Esselaar has conducted research into the 
mobile money space in developing world and authored and co-authored reports on the 
topic. Esselaar has lectured at the LINK Centre and I was aware of his interest and 
knowledge in the topic of research.  
 
Will Hahn: A recognised international commentator on the global 
telecommunications sector, Hahn is Principle Research Analyst Communications 
Service Provider Business Strategy at global research house, Garter. Hahn has a 
particular interest in the South African telecommunications industry and has visited 
South African many times to engage with local companies, conduct country research 
and present his findings at symposia. Hahn has engaged with many companies in the 
mobile payments industry and has a deep understanding of the global challenges and 
opportunities in the space.  
 
Arthur Goldstuck: Well known in the South African ICT industry, Goldstuck has 
written extensively on the telecommunications sector including the mobile money 
industry. His company, World Wide Worx conducts regular research on the mobile 
industry, including the strategies and performance of the mobile money initiatives. 
While Goldstuck kindly supplied some background material, his time allowed only a 
short response to the research question which was shared with him.  
 
Niti Bhan: is the founder and principle at Emerging Futures Lab. Bhan focuses on 
emerging market strategy and has novel ideas on the importance of social issues in the 
uptake of mobile money, evidenced in her many blogs and presentations on the topic.   
 
Ivo Vegter: Long time IT and news journalist, Vegter has written a number of articles 
on mobile money. He has extensively interviewed many executives in companies 
involved in the mobile money space and has presented papers on the topic at South 
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African technology conferences. Vegter is known for his strong views on the 
regulatory impact in South Africa as evidenced by his published works.  
 
Organisations which were approached but were not able to participate in the research 
included the Centre for Financial Regulation and Inclusion (Cenfri) and MTN Mobile 
Money. 
 
3.2.4 Research instrument  
 
By using the qualitative research methodology and a case study in particular, I intend 
to understand underlying meaning and patterns in the environment I am studying as 
suggested by Babbie (2004) and by contrasting and comparing the various business 
models and regulatory environments, I fulfilled the qualitative research objectives as 
highlighted by Cresswell (2003).  
 
3.2.4.1 Designing the interview questions  	  
Since a semi-structured interview technique was chosen, using open-ended questions, 
there could not be a set list of questions for each interviewee. To ensure I had some 
level of comparable data, however, I constructed a base set of questions which would 
ensure some commonality and would assist in compiling data that would adequately 
answer the main and sub research questions. This is included in Appendix A.  
 
I ensured I included appropriate questions, I asked three people who had a good 
understanding of the technology industry, but not necessarily the mobile money space, 
to read my baseline questions and then read my research question. I asked if the 
questions were understandable, would give enough data to answer the research 
question and if they thought there were any glaring omissions. Feedback from the 
pilots were taken into account, although very few changes were made.  
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3.2.4.2 Interview technique  
 
The purpose of this research is to achieve a clear oversight of all aspects which may 
impact end-user uptake of mobile money services. In the purpose statement I outlined 
the necessity for an holistic oversight of the mobile money ecosystem. To achieve this 
I first selected appropriate interviewees, who had a good understanding of the mobile 
money ecosystem. When approaching them to secure an interview, I gave them 
context of what we would be talking about by sending them my research question, but 
not the baseline question (Appendix A).  
 
During the interview I first established if the interviewee had any firm thoughts about 
the question and allowed the interview to move on from there. This open-ended and 
informal approach allowed me to explore additional angles which may not have been 
considered in the literature review. I made sure that additional questions based on the 
specific knowledge and experience of the interview were added. The aim of this 
method of questioning allowed for lateral thought on the part of the interviewee and 
better equipped me to fully explore themes and issues not included in the literature 
review.  
 
Toward the end of the interview I referred back to the baseline questions to ensure I 
had covered as many of them as possible. I made it clear that interviewees did not 
have to answer questions which they felt ill-equipped to handle or which they felt 
they did not have an opinion on.  
 
The informal, conversation-like interview technique put the interviewees at ease and 
allowed them to open up and share thoughts in a less rigid fashion.  
 
Face-to-face interviews were recorded for accuracy. The recordings were referred 
back to when drafting the findings of the interviews. The interview with Sutherland, 
however, happened at short notice and no recording was made. To avoid inaccurately 
quoting Sutherland, no direct quotations were used in the write-up of the analysis.   
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All interviewees were informed that information they shared would be part of a public 
document and that if they felt any information should not be made public, they should 
alert the interviewer. In some instances where information was considered sensitive 
by the interviewer, the interviewer alerted the interviewee and again ensured that the 
interviewee was comfortable with sharing the information.  
 
Interviewees were asked if they had supporting documentation or literature which 
would be appropriate for the research and if so, if they could share that secondary data. 
 
Follow-up questions were sent to some of the interviewees where clarity was required.  
  
The objective of the above research methodology was to add to the body of research 
around finding ways to accelerate mobile money uptake in particular and the creation 
of financial inclusion in general.  
 
3.2.5 Challenges and limitations  
 
The scope of the research is vast and necessitated a number of interviews. I believe it 
would have been beneficial to include at least one more mobile money player in 
South Africa. The opinions of the interviewees are subjective and can be tainted by 
their own personal experience – particularly interviewees who had negative 
experiences getting mobile money services operational or who were trying to justify 
their company’s strategy. For this reason I was sure to include interviewees who were 
not directly involved in the mobile money space and whose opinions were not 
coloured by company strategy.  
 
In the next chapter I examine the results of these interviews, referring to additional 
secondary data where necessary and to give context to the opinions of the 
interviewees.  
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CHAPTER 4 Research findings  	  
 
In this chapter I detail the outcomes of the interviews conducted. Highlighting the 
issues as they pertain to the research question in Chapter four based on the specific 
areas of knowledge for each interviewee. This is augmented by relevant secondary 
data where appropriate. 
 
4.1 Getting to grips with the real motivators  
(Sutherland. Interview. 15 November 2011) 
 
Ewan Sutherland is an independent telecommunication policy analyst and a visiting 
adjunct professor at the University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
Sutherland was approached to give insight into the mobile space, based on his interest 
in the telecommunications and mobile phone penetration.  
 
When looking at the South African environment and asking whether banks or mobile 
network operators are best placed to deliver mobile money services, Sutherland 
argues that banks are still best positioned to deliver products to the markets.  
 
According to Sutherland one needs to question the core competencies of mobile 
network operators in South Africa. While Sutherland acknowledges the need for 
mobile network operators to find additional revenue streams, he questions whether 
MNOs understand the complexities and products of banking.  
 
Sutherland says one should analyse the gap in the market and ask what product it is 
that people actually need. Then, one should ask if this gap fits into the competencies 
of the MNOs. In South Africa, Sutherland believes the banks can adequately fill the 
needs gap and this makes product offerings by the MNOs less compelling.  
 
When asked why the M-Pesa Kenya product was such a runaway success, given that 
is owned and operated by a MNO, Sutherland defended his position, saying Vodafone 
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had a distinct advantage because of its distribution model and market dominance at 
the time of its launch.  
 
Sutherland goes so far as to suggest that the reasons for M-Pesa’s success was a 
culmination of social, economic and political factors which happened at the right time 
and in the right environment, that it was perhaps something as simple as a perfect 
storm of all the right ingredients and that this may not ever be replicable.  
 
In contrast to the Kenyan situation at the launch of M-Pesa in the country, the South 
African banks are much sophisticated and Sutherland doubts whether the banks will 
allow the mobile operators to own the mobile money space, as it happened in Kenya.  
 
Looking at the possible motivators to encourage user uptake, Sutherland believes that 
remittances will be the big driver – particularly cross border mobile remittances.  
 
Finally, Sutherland suggests it is important to look at behavioural issues when 
analysing the reasons for user uptake of m-money services.  
 
4.2 Getting money home still a big drawcard 	  
(Ernst Van Rensburg. Interview. January 16 2012) 
Ernst Janse van Rensburg is Forex Managing Director – Africa, Asia for Sable Group 
Sable group started 20 years ago as an accounting firm. Remittances to countries from 
migrant workers in the UK is one of the services performed by the company.  
 
Van Rensburg explains many of his clients are Antipodeans working in the UK but 
who still need to get money home to service bonds or pay off student loans.  
 
The company remits to about 20 countries. For this reason Sable has to contend with 
compliance and licensing in each country and therefore has an excellent 
understanding of the complexities of cross border remittances.  
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The company does not work deal in cash-to-cash deals as van Rensburg says this 
plagued by money laundering, but rather focuses on integrating with existing 
networks and using their distribution models.  
 
Sable white labels many of its services for operators providing mobile wallets, where 
it handles all the back-ends solutions.  
 
Van Rensburg says it is important for governments to understand how money flows, 
and that governments tend to view mobile wallets in the same way as a bank.  
 
“Mobile wallets are governed by banking licenses which makes it easier. 
Governments are interested in how money moves, from whom, to whom and not into 
what,” (Ernst Van Rensburg. Interview. January 16 2012) 
 
Van Rensburg says his company has not experienced much difficulty when dealing 
with the regulators and securing licenses and advice form various government has 
been fairly easy.  
 
The company holds a Financial Services Board license as well as a Financial Services 
Authority license in South African and the UK respectively. Van Rensburg says the 
FSB has much stricter regulations including layers of cost, which he believes slows 
down the process and which impacts competitiveness in the region.  
 
“The FSB regulations reduces the number of entrants to the markets and the 
competitors. Those that do compete are doing in a more costly way which makes it 
more expensive for the consumer and reduces the number offerings rolled out.” (Ernst 
Van Rensburg. Interview. January 16 2012) 
 
Despite his criticism, Van Rensburg believes regulations are there for a good reason.  
 
He describes the remittances space in South Africa falling into three categories which 
may be considered to be obstructive: 
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Anti Money Laundering (AML) – Van Rensburg admits that the UK has suffered 
from external fraud and says he would like to see this regulation remain as it affords 
his company a measure of protection.  
 
Secondly, Van Rensburg points to the regulations around which companies can give 
advice and, again, says this should remain as it ensures companies playing in the 
remittance space are reputable.  
 
The third are regulation including Balance of Payments and thresholds, which Van 
Rensburg admits can be onerous.  
 
South Africa, like other countries which have high volumes such as China and India, 
make use of these kinds of regulations. Balance of Payments and threshold 
regulations require documentation of all transactions between countries and allow 
countries to establish inflows and outflows of money and is used as economic 
indicator.  
 
 Van Rensburg points out that many other countries rather make use of consultants to 
keep track of money flowing in and out of their borders and says it is a cheaper way 
of determining what constitutes remittance and what is foreign direct investment.  
 
Van Rensburg says the additional cost layer involved in reporting on Balance of 
Payments is passed on to consumers, through the added costs involved for companies 
who are required to comply to the administrative burden. Using consultants, however, 
would be passed on ubiquitously to the taxpayer as a cost of the Central Banks.  
 
An additional cost for South African financial institutions is the administration around 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) which forms part of the country’s KYC 
regulations.  
 
“The regulations in South Africa actually makes the revenue pie smaller. The only 
reason I can see for the third type or regulation is to protect our currency. In fact, this 
actually limits the amount of currency coming in to South Africa. No one wants to 
bring in money when they are limited to getting it out again. This hurts the banks 
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again as the revenues over the networks are smaller.” (Ernst Van Rensburg. Interview. 
January 16 2012) 
 
Despite the tight regulations, Van Rensburg says this does not presuppose a 
standardised way of doing business and licensing and KYC requirements are 
interpreted differently.  
 
Some banks are more flexible, are willing to walk into grey space – typically 
the newer banks. The big four (FNB, Standard, Nedbank and ABSA) are 
stricter. Investec, Sasfin, Mercantile bank etc, will work with the customer. 
They won’t compromise on compliance, but they are actively seeking to make 
the pie bigger. The big four are risk adverse. I think this is because the 
legislation is not perfectly clear and I don't think it needs to be. (Ernst Van 
Rensburg. Interview. January 16 2012)  
 
Van Rensburg says he believes the KYC regulations should have a degree of 
flexibility, but wants overall integrity to be retained. According to Van Rensburg the 
CFT regulations are getting stricter and says the company has an ever-increasing list 
of political campaign managers and suspected terrorists which have to checked 
against as both the receiver and the sender.  
 
Looking at the mobile money uptake in South Africa, Van Rensburg says there is a 
much bigger need for the services in Africa. The services are more additive in South 
Africa and there is not the same need for the services. He also says the lower need as 
well as the harsh regulations affects remittance volume which, in turn, impacts the 
profitability of the services.  
 
Looking at the corporate view of the South African environment, Van Rensburg says 
the private sector views the regulations as bringing inefficiencies and says the Central 
Bank needs to ask itself it is really protecting the currency with the current laws.  
 
Van Rensburg believes lower banks charges would attract more South African 
customers, that these fees are the biggest concerns for potential customers and that an 
interest-bearing product would have minimal appeal to the South African market.  
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4.3 Remittance continues to drive growth   
 
(Burrell. Interview. 7 March 2012) 
 
Rob Burrell is managing director of Mukuru.com, a service which focuses on 
international remittances. Mukuru.com is registered in the UK and remits to countries 
across the globe. Mukuru.com has strong ties with Zimbabwe and facilitates payments 
of migrant workers in South Africa wishing to send money home. It makes use of 
online and mobile functionality and has been operating for six years.  
 
Burrell explains obtaining a license to remit was arduous and took the company 
eighteen months. This is in stark relief compared to the early days of operating in the 
UK when there were over 6000 licenses and, for 60 UK Pounds, a company could be 
up and running and handling money.  
 
Burrell is supportive of the tighter regulations and believes this gives the remittance 
industry credibility and a better chance at sustainability. Indeed he points to South 
Africa’s strict financial regulations as what saved the country during the sub-prime 
crisis and ensuing global meltdown.  
 
Burrell believes the current tightening of regulations in the UK will have some impact 
on companies registered and operating in the country. A little over two months ago 
Mukuru.com was asked to ensure additional layers of banking compliance and Burrell 
says this now puts the company on similar compliance levels as the big players such 
as HSBC and others.  
 
While this is onerous, Burrell says he remains open to the stricter regulations and will 
only be in a position to judge the value of the work to comply once the exercise is 
over and he can accurately judge its efficacy in hindsight.  
 
Commenting on the success of M-Pesa Kenya, Burrell points to the excellent 
branding of the product as well as the trust that was so quickly established in the 
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product in such a short period of time. However, Burrell raises an important factor, 
which he believes is often overlooked when researchers analyse the success of M-
Pesa Kenya.  
 
A CGAP report (August 2009) references the reliance of Kenyan nationals on the M-
Pesa service to transfer money and airtime from rural populations to urban recipients 
– a reversal in the normal flows of money. This was due to the banks and transport 
facilities shutting down during the post election riots in late 2007 and early 2008.  
 
Burrell believes the importance of this one-time socio-political event had a significant 
impact on the uptake of the services, circumventing the usual long adoption curve of 
m-money services. Quite simply, Burrell believes the population had no choice but to 
trust the service, as it was the only means they could operate during the period.  
 
Analysing the South African market, Burrell believes interoperability will have a 
significant impact on the uptake of m-money services. He also believes the trust 
threshold in South Africa has yet to be crossed, but says of all the services currently 
on offer in the country, the FNB service is the one to watch.  
 
The use of Near Field Communications (NFC) may also hold a key to m-money 
services reaching scale in South Africa and Burrell says this will have a significant 
impact on the ‘send side’ of the m-money ecosystem.   
 
4.4 Over regulation stifling innovation  
 
(Collins. Interview. 6 March 2012) 
 
Gary Collins is a strategy consultant focusing on telecommunications, media and 
technology. He has consulted to many sub Saharan mobile network operators, some 
of whom are looking to implement mobile money projects.  
 
Collins believes the South African regulatory environment is lacking clear legislation 
on mobile money. Collins is also of the opinion the South African Reserve Bank is 
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naturally focused on protecting the interests of the big four banks (ABSA, FNB, 
Standard Bank and Nedbank) and the lack of clear legislation may be playing into 
their hands by keeping the regulatory space unclear and, thereby limiting competition 
in the mobile money space.  
 
In his article, “How over regulation has stifled the pace of mobile money adoption in 
Africa” (Collins September 2011) Collins boldly states: 
 
The overly-cautious, regulatory driven bank-led approach has all but killed off 
the possibility of producing an MPESA-like agile, cheap, customer-friendly 
mobile money application or solutions built around the requirements that sub-
Saharan African customers so desperately need. This has had profound effects 
on the pace of mobile money adoption. Collins (September 2011) 
 
Collins believes the M-Pesa Kenya example highlights what is possible in a light-
touch regulatory environment. The Central Banks of Kenya also worked with the 
creators of M-Pesa and took a somewhat relaxed view on the startup company, 
regulating after the fact. Something which never happened in South Africa according 
to Collins  
 
“The Reserve Bank’s role is not to be an innovator. It is a partner of the established 
banks,” (Collins. Interview. 6 March 2012) 
 
Collins acknowledges the importance of the mobile network operators in the m-
money ecosystem, pointing to their lower cost of distribution. He believes, however, 
that the MNOs are happy to leave the business of mobile money to the banks through 
joint ventures saying the gains of the data travelling over the MNO networks is 
enough of a motivator for the network operators.  
According to Collins, the catalyst for change in the South African space will only 
come through a government-led push to change legislation. National legislation on 
how South African companies deal with risk will determine which new players can 
enter the m-money space.  
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Collins is sceptical about the future of M-Pesa South Africa. He believes the simple 
money-in, money-out functionality and low fees in Kenyan model will not be 
replicable in South Africa due to the prohibitive legislation.  
 
4.5 M-Pesa South Africa: playing for the endgame   
 
(Taylor. Interview. 9 March 2012) 
 
 Mark Taylor is Executive Manager of Vodacom M-Pesa. The service launched late in 
2010 and is currently looking at ways to increase the number of users after a difficult 
couple of years.  
 
Taylor believes that banks in South Africa all interpret the regulations governing m-
money differently. Both Circular 6 and Exemption 17, and how they are currently 
interpreted, are impeding the uptake of users. He says the Vodacom M-Pesa banking 
partner, Nedbank, has recently informed the regulator that it is interpreting both 
Circular 6 and Exemption 17 in ways which will allow it to lower the burden of KYC 
proof when signing up as well as the transaction limits such as the R1000.00 daily 
limits for clients who have opened their accounts using non face-to-face ways.  
 
Taylor believes this has move has been a long time coming and expects it to have a 
positive impact on the user experience and the number of users signing up for the 
product.  
 
Taylor expresses a level of frustration with both the banks and the regulations. Taylor 
says, M-Pesa is simply trying to increase the liquidity levels and the movement of 
money within the economy. It is not trying to perform complex asset finance and 
should therefore qualify for a much simpler regulatory regime.  
 
Banks should also be encouraged to open up their infrastructure to allow greater 
interoperability. Taylor believes this will help m-money products become more 
attractive and meaningful to all South Africans. However, Taylor says there still 
exists a level of wariness of mobile money from the banks.  Taylor also believes the 
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banks in South Africa don’t interpret legislation in the spirit they are intended which 
is holding up change.  
 
Despite this frustration, Taylor believes the regulator is trying to encourage a more 
enabling environment, saying the regulator has often met with M-Pesa South Africa 
and asked the company to explain what is needed and expressed a willingness to 
address hurdles to uptake.  
 
According to Taylor, the one of the biggest challenges is getting money from the 
formal into the informal sectors. This has been evidenced by the slow start from M-
Pesa South Africa, signing up only 140 000 users by June 2011. (Financial Sector 
Forum, June 2011)  
 
The turnaround referred to by Vodacom CEO, Pieter Uys, in June 2011 
(MyBroadband June 2011) has been much anticipated by the South African market.  
 
Taylor confirmed exclusively in the interview that M-Pesa will be publically 
announcing a pre-paid Visa debit card linked to all M-Pesa wallets in July 2012. The 
product will be available to everyone who has a Vodacom cellphone, placing the pre-
paid cards into hundreds of thousands of South African’s hands.  
 
This card would be competing with the product announced by Visa and MTN in 2011 
which will allow users to transfer money from a Visa debit of credit card to any 
international Visa card via the MTN service. (Tech Central November 2011) 
 
M-Pesa South Africa has also linked its products to a number of competitions with 
big local brands. A 2012 Coca Cola competition has made use of M-Pesa to payout 
the prize money. Over 60 000 prizes have required winners to register for the account 
to collect their winnings. Similar below the line competition marketing has been done 
with the likes of South African Breweries and with bread maker, Sasko.  
 
M-Pesa South Africa will also hook into the national distribution channels so users 
can by pre-paid electricity, airtime and even lottery tickets.  
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Taylor believes the future of mobile-money will be linked to the big card companies. 
He references the South African social grant system which is now working as a card-
based system. This 10.8 million-strong user base will certainly increase the awareness 
of the average user.  
 
Taylor confirms M-Pesa will not be applying for its own banking license any time 
soon as for now, will continue working with the banks rather than alone.  
 
Looking at the challenges facing South African mobile money products, Taylor 
admits education is still a big stumbling block and points out that marketing a fairly 
complex product has its drawbacks.  
 
Distribution has also proved a challenge and Taylor bemoans the currently anti money 
laundering (AML) legislation which he says has made signing up spaza shop owners 
as agents particularly difficult. These are key factors in the distribution network, 
taking services into the more remote areas. Many of the shop owners are foreign 
nationals and current AML legislation requires agents have a South African identity 
document if they want to participate in the M-Pesa scheme. 
 
Taylor believes this could be overcome with proper AML legislation. In a similar line 
of argument, Taylor says the Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations should be 
streamlined. The current regulatory overlap with RICA and FICA have made it very 
difficult for users to register for new services and Taylor suggest one agency 
overseeing the KYC regulations for financial and mobile registration.  
 
4.6 South Africa – a complex regulatory environment  
(Esselaar. Personal Correspondence. 11 March 2012) 
 
Steve Esselaar is the principle telecommunications consultant at Intelecom. Esselaar 
specialises in policy and regulatory issues in developing countries.    
 
Esselaar believes the mobile money regulatory environment in South Africa is a 
complex one. The country has a significant amount of existing financial infrastructure 
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in comparison to nearly all other African countries. Esselaar believes the Reserve 
Bank sees more overlap between the existing infrastructure and the potential of m-
money. Esselaar points out the Mzanzi account shares some of the basic 
characteristics of m-money such lower banking fees, lower reporting requirements 
(AML & KYC).  
 
“Mzanzi has been quite successful in adding increasing banking penetration. Given 
the existing financial infrastructure, I don’t think that regulation has really held the 
South African m-money situation back” (Esselaar. Personal Correspondence 11 
March 2012) 
 
However, Esselaar acknowledges the lighter-touch regulatory environment in other 
African countries have facilitated the uptake of services.  
 
“The lighter-touch regulatory environment was the single most important factor in 
Kenya. Unfortunately, the Kenyan example has generally not been followed. For 
example, in Nigeria, the mobile money regulations do not allow a mobile network 
operator (MNO) to be the lead in a mobile money operation.”(Esselaar. Personal 
Correspondence 11 March 2012) 
 
Esselaar explains that the public reason (i.e. those given in speeches or via interviews) 
was that the Nigerian government didn’t want to “distract” MNOs from their core 
competency, particularly since, in Nigeria, quality of mobile service is poor.  
 
This is clearly rubbish and the more likely reasons are that the Nigerian 
government is extremely concerned that foreign owned companies (such as 
MTN) might control a significant portion of the Nigerian economy if mobile 
money takes off. The problem with this approach is simply that the companies 
with the resources, agents etc. are the mobile operators (as well as the 
experience in other countries to run m-money). (Esselaar. Personal 
Correspondence 11 March 2012) 
 
Esselaar acknowledges that the business model also affects the uptake of mobile 
money services. He puts forward the notion that if a country has a low amount of 
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alternative financial infrastructure (ATMs, POS, bank branches) as is the case in 
Nigeria, then a simple business model (usually MNO led) that looks as person-to-
person first, and then builds on top of that as the service takes off, is appropriate. He 
contends this the situation is far more complex the more existing financial 
infrastructure there is – such as the case in South Africa.  
 
Issues such as marketing, user education, literacy and cultural mistrust of formal 
financial services can be critical. Esselaar points to the Nigerian market, where 
several banks had to be rescued by the state in 2008, leading to an investor run on 
these banks. In addition, in Nigeria, ATMs were very poorly distributed and 
sometimes incorrectly dispensed money. Esselaar holds that these factors, combined, 
led to a general level of distrust of banks. This would then open the doors for the 
mobile network operators, who conversely, enjoyed significant levels of trust and 
users were more comfortable using mobile money operations run by the MNOs and 
not banks. Esselaar holds that marketing can therefore be critical in order to overcome 
these issues of distrust.  
 
Esselaar contends that South Africa will not reach the same levels of success as in 
Kenya.  
 
The key difference was that there was no other alternative in Kenya – there was no 
other way to transfer money. Then, when MPESA arrived, suddenly there was this 
easy system to transfer money. SA has a much, much larger economy with much 
greater penetration of banking services. There just isn’t the same level of demand in 
SA as compared to Kenya. This isn’t to say that m-money may not take off – its just 
that m-money will take off alongside (as a complement) to existing financial services. 
(Esselaar. Personal Correspondence. March 11 2012) 
 
However, Esselaar concedes that m-money will become increasingly important to 
South African banks in years to come. While this will not be the case for the mobile 
network operators which still rely heavily on the data revenues.  
 
Finally, Esselaar predicts mobile money services will continue to grow in South 
Africa, capturing some of the market that Mzanzi can’t access. However, he believes 
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the real catalyst for growth in South African will be the seamless interoperability 
between m-money and existing financial services.  
 
4.7 Is mobile money in South African designed for failure? 
(Vegter. Personal Correspondence. 14 February 2012) 
 
Ivo Vegter is a South African journalist who has published and spoken extensively on 
mobile banking and mobile money. He has covered the area for over a decade and has 
interviewed both local and foreign players in the field of mobile commerce for as long.  
 
Vegter believes the biggest hurdle to uptake of mobile money in South Africa is 
regulatory. This, says Vegter, includes foreign exchange controls, FICA and most 
importantly the Banking Act clause, which limits deposit taking to 
licensed banks.  For this reason, Vegter claims it is hard for small, innovative and 
low-cost mobile money solutions to break into the market. 
 
Vegter argues that the MNOs have been forced to partner with banks to offer 
mobile money services. In principle, Vegter believes an MNO with a prepaid offering 
takes deposits, and has all the infrastructure required to operate transactional accounts, 
whether denominated in Rands or minutes. The Banking Act, however, prohibits them 
from permitting cash withdrawals (technically, refunds he argues), because that would 
constitute deposit taking. He also believes the MNOs are deeply mindful not to offend 
the big banks and government.  
 
They are terrified of offending the big banks, and offending the governments to which 
they are beholden for their telecoms licences. If you hear an MNO source say they'd 
love to be a bank, record it. Most will furiously deny any such ambition. (Vegter. 
Personal Correspondence. 11 February 2012) 
 
Vegter contends banks themselves are also highly restricted by the bureaucratic 
overhead of regulations like FICA, which limits the scope of the market they could 
reach. They also do not have the infrastructure to reach the broader informal and poor 
markets. “There's a reason those markets are "unbanked": banks are simply not 
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capable of addressing them profitably.” (Vegter. Personal Correspondence. 11 
February 2012) 
 
Vegter adds to his argument by pointing out that the products traditional banks do 
have are subject to fees and charges that are small in relation to medium incomes, but 
nominally very high in relation to low incomes. He says this is why many poor 
customers are unwilling to commit their money to the banks. They keep more of it 
simply by retaining the cash, and this is a major issue if your income 
is low. H argues that depositing R100 in a bank and getting R88 back strikes a poor 
person as “an insanely stupid swindle”.  
 
Vegter argues the fees attached to banking of any kind is a major hurdle for a large 
segment of the potential market.  
He goes on to challenge the business motives of banks when it comes to banking the 
previously unbanked. 
 
Traditional banks can't afford to care about the poor (to put it kindly), despite what 
they say. More likely, they don't care because they don't have to care. Exorbitant and 
sometimes extortionate fees are the price we pay for regulatory protection of a cartel 
of banking license holders. For those who don't earn much, that cartel offers 
nothing but dead losses. (Vegter. Personal Correspondence. February 11 2012)  
 
Competitors, whether MNOs or independent services, try to 
address this problem by, for example, charging fees for services that 
save a customer a few hours and a taxi fare into town. Vegter gives the example that 
was given to him by Wizzit some years ago:  
 
Instead of R20 airtime costing R20 plus a morning and a R10 taxi fare to town, users 
can save the R10 and several hours by using mobile money to buy the airtime.  
 
Vegter believes mobile banking should offer the poor a way to receive money from 
anyone, including overseas (for example selling wares to tourists), a way to send 
money to anyone, including overseas (remittances), and a way to store money safely, 
and to do all of this without feeling that they're losing any of it when compared to the 
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cost of transacting with cash. Service providers should make money from actual cost 
savings, or from related services, advertising and other possibilities.  
 
Arrangements to make transacting cheaper, rather than more expensive, will 
make mobile banking more appealing to rural and poor communities. 
However, the upstarts that, unlike banks, are able to offer this kind of service 
find themselves thwarted by needing a banking licence or a partner with a 
banking licence, in order to offer any meaningful money-related services. That 
instantly raises the barriers to entry sky-high, or lumps them with the very 
same bank charges that they were trying to avoid in the first place. That, I 
believe, is why we're not seeing people like Wizzit, Pocit or Ukash killing the 
big four in the broad mobile money market. (Vegter. Personal Correspondence. 
11 February 2012)  
 
 
Vegter believes the Reserve Bank is not going to let go of the existing Banking Act 
deposit-taking clause. He argues that the official reason is to protect depositors, but 
calls this “absolute nonsense’ and says this could easily be achieved in ways far less 
onerous than the Banking Act. Vegter says the real reason for the deposit-taking 
licences is that the South African Reserve Banks cannot countenance alternative 
currencies.  
 
If airtime, or loyalty points, or air miles, or Mxit moolah, or US dollars, can 
act as a fully-fledge currency inside South Africa, the Reserve Bank loses 
control over monetary policy, which means it can no longer print money to 
achieve inflation, which means the government loses the power to invisibly tax 
the entire monetary base to fund deficit spending. Inflationary monetary policy 
of central banks is a whole different discussion, related to the nature and 
purpose of fiat currency, but it offers a 
great underlying macro-economic motive for why the regulatory environment 
is broken, and is likely to remain so. (Vegter. Personal Correspondence 11 
February 2012).  
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4.8 MNOs versus banks – a race to the bottom?  
 
(Hahn. Personal Correspondence. 6 March 2012) 
 
Will Hahn is Principle Research Analyst Communications Service Provider Business 
Strategy at research house, Gartner. Hahn has a thorough understanding of the South 
African market and has visited the country many times. Hahn has answered his 
questions based on the narrower field of mobile payments rather than the broader 
mobile money space.  
Hahn sees cross-border remittances as being a key driver for South African players. 
He notes that South Africa’s international controls are considered to be fairly strict by 
global standards. While Hahn believes South African regulations governing mobile 
payments to be no worse than many countries in the emerging world, he believes 
regulatory barriers should be lowered if the country is to realise the opportunity 
presenting itself in the field of remittances.  
Hahn believes in many instances in the developing regions, the mobile operators used 
their size and market penetration to quickly rollout services. This left the less agile 
regulators to play catch-up with the new services.  
User scepticism is something which Hahn acknowledges has to be overcome in order 
achieve success. He sees no clear indication that users are more in favour of bank-led 
or operator-led offerings, and says it is all about overcoming mistrust and positioning 
the user benefits.  
“Who do users hate more than banks? Maybe the telco is the only 
competition! So this is a race to the bottom in some ways. I don’t have a 
strong sense that Communication Service Provider-led m-payment services 
are well received as alternatives to bank-led services. It’s more a question of 
extending service to folks who never had a bank account.” (Hahn. Personal 
Communication 14 February 2012). 
While Hahn sees the prospects of mobile payments in South Africa as fairly good, he 
won’t commit to which provider will be the one who strikes the tipping point. He 
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   71	  
cautions, however, that many m-payment schemes in the developed world are not 
proving nearly as convenient or irresistible as their proponents claim. Hahn also 
confirms that he has not picked up a sense of urgency from either the banks or the 
mobile network operators in South Africa.  
They’re (the banks) in it, maybe for similar reasons that Vodacom is doing the 
SA version of M-Pesa. They are trying some things but I had no sense that it 
was full steam ahead, we know what we want…I think the MNOs are playing 
rather defensively, not wanting to be left out in case something takes off. 
(Hahn. Personal Correspondence. 14 February 2012) 
Finally, in his predictions of future performance of m-payments, Hahn believes the 
needs of the users will ultimately determine the uptake of services.  
In cases of the true emerging market (where CSP agents outnumber bank 
branches and ATMS by 5-10x) m-payment services for things like remittance 
and micro-purchase will take hold and do well. South Africa is on the verge of 
true e-commerce as a real competitor to brick-and-mortar purchasing. M-
payment should be an important part of this transition, and it is moving 
forward steadily if slowly. (Hahn. Personal Correspondence 14 February 2012) 
In contrast, South African analyst and founder of research house, World Wide Worx, 
Arthur Goldstuck, believes the cause for the ongoing lack of uptake lies in a lack of 
understanding what the consumer really needs, and how they can fulfil those needs.   
I think the key issue is that mobile money services target the wrong need. The 
purveyors of mobile money argue from a self-interest point of view, and tend 
to blame external factors for lack of take-up, when it is in fact a structural 
issue, namely that the needs met by mobile money are already being met by 
other means. (Goldstuck. Personal Correspondence. 2 March 2012) 
4.9 Demand driven growth the key to sustainability  	  
(Bhan. Personal Correspondence. 6 March 2012) 
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Niti Bhan is the founder and principle at Emerging Futures Lab. Bhan focuses on 
emerging markets strategy and has written extensively on business, design and 
engineering as they pertain to socio-economic development and innovation, 
particularly in the rapidly growing bottom of the pyramid and emerging markets. 
 
Bhan supports the notion that mobile money initiatives which are launched into a low 
or light-touch regulatory environment have a greater chance of success. She 
references India’s fairly low m-money uptake as a proof point of this.  
 
Kenya's MPesa was launched first and the bankers regulated after the fact, 
whereas seeing this experience, many other countries put their bankers at 
work first to regulate. We have seen little evidence of the kind of uptake that 
Kenya has show in these (developing) countries but then again, there are 
myriads of reasons.  (Bhan. Personal Correspondence 6 March 2012) 
 
Bhan argues that business models have yet to begin the product design from the end-
user’s point of view. She contends that by starting with a good understanding of the 
people who will use the service, there is a greater chance of success.  
 
In my opinion, everyday user centered designers who work in innovation know 
nothing about what they will create or what will emerge, but they start by 
understanding people and their needs and operating environment and 
challenges and constraints and then attempt to develop solutions that fit those 
criteria. Lowers the barriers to adoption if you start by looking for what the 
end user needs rather than what will benefit the company or the banks, no? 
(Bhan. Personal Correspondence 6 March 2012) 
 
4.10 Skills are the real issue 
 
(Van Rensburg. Interview. 18 January 2012) 
 
Hannes Van Rensburg is the CEO of Fundamo, a Visa company. Van Rensburg 
founded the company in 1999 and has been responsible for some of the first mobile 
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money deployments in the world. Fundamo has rolled out a little under 100 mobile 
money projects across the world.  
 
Van Rensburg admits that there have been some mobile money projects which have 
underperformed, but he qualifies this by making a personal distinction, saying a big 
percentage of deployments are not ‘spectacularly’ successful. He make the distinction 
between those that are ‘spectacularly’ successful and those which are ‘marginally’ 
successful.  
 
When asked to define scale, Van Rensburg says he sees scale as 30 percent 
penetration of the target market, when 30 percent (or over) of subscribers regularly 
transact on the network  
 
The frequency of transaction becomes an issue for the operators which are looking to 
avoid account dormancy. Van Rensburg points out that dormancy is not a problem if 
there is the network effect evident, and says that if there are 30 percent or more users 
in the target market then there are enough people for the user to can transact with. 
When asked, Van Rensburg agrees that this network affect aligns itself to the chicken-
and-egg effect described by Mas and Radcliffe. (2010) 
 
Van Rensburg conceded that light-touch regulation certainly makes for an easier 
rollout. However he believes the problems with regulations is over accentuated and 
believes there are very few countries where there are problems with over regulation. 
These are typically the bigger countries like India and Nigeria and Van Rensburg says 
one can understand why regulators are more careful.  
 
If something goes wrong in a smaller country it’s more easily contained than 
if it goes wrong in a big country like India. People are blaming regulations 
and it’s not that in most countries, in most countries regulations are not the 
problem – not even close. (Van Rensburg. Interview. 18 January 2012) 
 
Van Rensburg holds that people involved in mobile money implementations are quick 
to blame regulations as a means to detract from bad implementation and abdicating 
any responsibility.  
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The real problem, according to Van Rensburg, is ‘retail distribution 101’. Basic 
business issues need to be addressed on how to sell a product, how to market it, how 
to distribute and promote it. Quite simply, Van Rensburg believes people involved in 
mobile money projects which are not performing are not focusing on basic business 
issues.  
 
I think a key problem is that it’s not always the A-Team that gets to do the 
work. So, for instance I am running an MNO in country X, I have challenges, I 
have to distribute prepaid airtime, my network is under strain. Then they are 
told they have to do the mobile money product as well… they look for the most 
available person, not the best person to do the rollout. So if you don’t have the 
A-Team working on the project you are going to have B-Team results. And in 
many instances that’s the case. (Van Rensburg. Interview. 18 January 2012) 
 
Van Rensburg puts down the success stories to good business management. The 
success of M-Pesa Kenya can be attributed to now ex-CEO Michael Joseph. Similarly, 
the success of MTN in Uganda can be attributed to Richard Mwami, Head of Public 
Access & Mobile Money, MTN Uganda. “If you don't have a striker you are not 
going to score a goal.” (Van Rensburg. Interview. 18 January 2012) 
 
Given the position Van Rensburg takes on the challenges in reaching scale, it is not 
surprising that he doesn’t believe it matters whether an implementation is bank-led or 
MNO-led.  
 
It doesn't really matter. In South Africa the banks are successful. In West 
Africa the operators are. I think it’s unnecessary argument. It should be about 
how am I taking this to market, do I have good management, do I have good 
controls in place?  And am I doing it in the right way? That is the problem, 
there are not enough skills to roll out these projects. (Van Rensburg.Interview. 
18 January 2012) 
 
Van Rensburg is emphatic that the biggest challenge facing the mobile money 
industry currently is the lack of appropriate training and tertiary courses and degrees.  
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How many people can say they are experts in mobile money and have done 
implementations before? Which tertiary institution can you go to for a degree 
in banking the unbanked? There are financial degrees, certainly and even 
banking degrees, but none in this specific field. There is not a serious industry 
that doesn’t have a career path that will allow learners to enter into the 
career and perform. (Van Rensburg. Interview. 18 January 2012) 
 
Van Rensburg believes the solution lies with the universities to work with 
organisations like CGAP and companies such as his own. He says Fundamo would be 
eager to work with others to build and design industry appropriate degrees. While 
Van Rensburg acknowledges there are post-graduate degrees in the field, and that 
there is a wealth of research taking place around mobile money, he feels there is not 
enough of the research finding its way back into the university under-graduate 
classrooms. “The research should go back into producing people we can use in 
industry,” he states.  
 
When asked how this affects Fundamo, Van Rensburg jokingly says half of the 
industry skills sit in his offices in Cape Town. On a more serious note, Van Rensburg 
admits that the company actively seeks out skills, especially ones who have worked 
on successful implementations, including many who had been involved in M-Pesa 
Kenya.  
 
Van Rensburg is reticent to comment negatively on the South African mobile money 
performance. He believes FNB has been successful in its mobile delivery, but hastens 
to add that South Africa is a complex model, both from a regulatory as well as 
technical side. However, he is quick to make the distinction between a constrained 
regulatory environment, preferring to call it ‘sophisticated’ and says it is not always 
easy to understand how to engage in the market. He references the many channels 
through which money can already move, including the large ATM network, 
supermarkets such as Shoprite Checkers and others.  
 
Van Rensburg says because there is such a sophisticated market with such good 
existing infrastructure, the South African market is definitely not on the company’s 
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radar. Last year Fundamo generated only two percent of its revenue from the South 
African market.   
 
Turning to technology Van Rensburg is sceptical about newer technologies such as 
near field communications (NFC). He refers back to the invention of EMV (chip card 
technology).  
 
Billions of rands were spent in the retail industry to upgrade from swipe card 
technology to pin-based technology over a four to five year period. None of those 
terminals are NFC ready. So somebody has to go to the retailers and tell them they 
have to upgrade again. There will be a big resistance to this and it will be twenty 
years before we have ubiquitous tap-your-phone payment solutions. By then, there 
will be another technology which will have surpassed this. (Van Rensburg. Interview. 
January 18 2012) 
 
Having said this, Van Rensburg says South Africa will have some form of NFC but 
does not believe it will be a game changer, saying it is more hype than ubiquitous 
reality for the country. 
 
When examining the efficacy of mobile money, Van Rensburg believes researchers 
need to make the difference clear on what m-money projects can do. He contends it is 
not so much about bringing the unbanked into the fold, (although this is important, 
and is happening) but rather about getting the under-banked making more regular use 
of the features offered by the services. The more transactions are carried out, the more 
services will be offered, including the governmental prerogative of saving.  
 
Pricing awareness, lack of education on how to actually use the services etc. are all 
holding success back – all of this can be solved if the services are managed properly. 
Van Rensburg repeats his assertion that regulations are being unfairly blamed by 
managers of m-money operations for the lack of success – often in an effort to cover 
up their own inability to lead the projects.   
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4.11 Regulating for financial inclusion 
 
(Krugel. Interview. 19 March 2012) 
 
Gavin Krugel is Chief Customer Strategy Officer at Fundamo, a Visa Company. 
Krugel has also worked as a Senior Director at the GSM Association. Krugel has been 
recognised as an expert mobile financial services mobile money and financial 
inclusion.  
 
Krugel believes that regulations governing mobile money are beginning to show signs 
of maturity. He says when mobile money first hit the markets, the regulators rushed to 
protect the financial franchise but says as the market, and the regulators, began to 
understand the need for financial inclusion. This, together with the dawning 
realisation of the possible profits to be made from the bottom of the pyramid, led a 
growing relaxation of regulations. These included the ability for agents to perform 
basic cash-in/ cash-out functionality and the lowering of the KYC restrictions.  
 
In hindsight the initial over regulation may have been a necessary evil. If we 
look at the environment today we can see a move toward open regulation and 
this enables non-banks to enter into the market. (Krugel. Interview.19 March 
2012) 
 
Krugel admits there are still areas affected by ‘odd’ regulations, pointing to Indonesia, 
which he says is still behind the regulatory curve.   
 
When it comes to South Africa, however, Krugel believes the stiff regulatory 
environment has afforded the banks ten years to assess the environment and make 
their move.  
 
Krugel suggests this has been achieved, in part, through the self-regulating payments 
body, the Payment Association of South Africa (PASA).  
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Initiated in 1994 by a coalition of banks and the South African Reserve Bank, PASA 
was formed to formulate the long-term strategy and modernisation of the South 
African National Payments System (NPS).  It gained formal status in 1998 through 
the NPS Act and is constituted as a self-regulating management body for the national 
payment system.   
 
The PASA constitution (PASA 2010) calls for members of the organisation to: 
 
protect themselves, other Members and PASA, against risks emanating from 
their participation in the NPS, as well as from other participants or 
stakeholders in and/or users of the NPS; and 
assist PASA in enabling the Reserve Bank to adequately oversee the affairs of 
PASA and its Members in the discharge of the Reserve Bank's responsibilities 
regarding the monitoring, regulation and supervision of payment, clearing and 
settlement systems; (PASA 2010, pg 19) 
 
Krugel points out the membership requirements of PASA is restricted to institutions 
which are allowed to link into the NPS – i.e. those entities which hold banking 
licences.  
 
With this in mind Kugel questions why the members of PASA would allow non-
banks into the membership of 24 licence holders, saying it would not be in their 
interest. Krugel goes on to refer to this dominance of banks as akin to an oligopoly.   
 
The era of strict regulations has effectively given South African banks ten years to 
study the bottom of the pyramid market. Krugel says the banks have not made the 
most of that time though and in the last ten years, the banks have become less inclined 
to deliver services to a banking-saturated market.  
 
While Krugel questions if South African banks have actually made good on financial 
inclusion, he suggests though, that the banks have developed a network which the 
banks would argue delivers on financial inclusion. This would be born out by the high 
percentage of banked people in South Africa.  
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This small remaining group of the unbanked are not attracting the attention of the 
banks. From a purely profit-based point of view, Krugel believes the poor, unbanked 
population in South Africa do not make for a compelling market. Looking at the 
acquisition costs of each customer (in the order of a couple of hundred rands) Krugel 
believes innovating for the person who earns between R20 to R35 per day hardly 
makes for a compelling business case.  
 
Looking at the innovation in the South African banking space, Krugel says the South 
African banks have launched a host of new products in the last ten years, but this does 
not constitute true financial inclusion.  
 
He contends banks are innovating on price and convenience. What draws a customer 
is the new application for mobile banking. What sells consumers on the product is the 
marginally attractive price. However, Krugel says this is not really a new innovation, 
it’s just market segmentation and marketing.  
 
Finally, Krugel analyses the mobile money space and says the real inhibitors to 
mobile money schemes reaching scale is not the lack of demand. Rather, he believes 
it is the lack of understanding by companies launching the services that what they are 
really launching is a bank – with all the complications, complexities and ramifications 
of this challenge.  
 
I have visited nine mobile money initiatives in the last four months and I have 
been flabbergasted at who is running them.  It is not bankers, or even 
experienced business people. It is middle management IT guys. Given that 
between six and fifteen percent of an MNO revenue could be derived from a 
successful mobile money offering, this makes no sense. One company was 
launching a national product with three fulltime employees to oversee this. 
The real reason mobile money schemes are not reaching scale is the lack of 
allocation of appropriate resources to build and lead the business. (Krugel. 
Interview. 19 March 2012) 
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4.12 Interoperability the key for South Africa 
 
(Mitchell. Interview. 22 March 2012) 
 
Dave Mitchell, Head: National Payment System Department at the South African 
Reserve Bank works closely with the South African financial institutions and 
companies involved in the mobile money ecosystem. He has been instrumental in the 
development of the Reserve Bank payment strategy including the Vision 2015 
positioning paper (South African Reserve Bank September 2011) 
 
Mitchell explains that South Africa now has 14 e-money products, including e-wallets, 
making the regulation of the environment more complex, and important. Mitchell 
holds that his department has an open mind when it comes to the regulation of mobile 
money, actively searching for innovative ways to address the complexities of the 
South African situation.  
 
Added to this Mitchell points out that there are 23 banks involved in the national 
payment system as well as the four mobile network operators, making the mobile 
money environment a complex one. The Reserve Banks has adopted a consultative 
approach to formulating policy and meets regularly with all the players involved as 
well as 78 non-bank companies which supply services such as IT support and third 
parties involved in the payments space.  
 
Mitchell explains that many companies visit the Reserve Bank, wishing to discuss 
their new products. However, he says many of these companies are technology driven 
and want to control the entire process, including the legislated issues surrounding the 
e-float. Mitchell points out that the daily settlement amounts can equate to up to 20 
percent of the value of the float and see profit in this.  
 
The Reserve Bank and Mitchell’s team have been working closely with the Financial 
Service Authority (FSA). He explains that three-tier licencing arrangement the FSA 
use has been closely assessed.  
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This system allows for three distinct tiers. The first is the most restrictive with strict 
compliance and is open only to those with a full banking licence, with no limit to the 
liabilities. The second allows non-banks a limited licence with e-money liabilities not 
exceeding 25 million pounds. The third, is considered a closed loop environment and 
has a reporting requirements of six months and e-money liabilities of 5 million 
pounds.  
 
While Mitchell admits this system has its attractions, the Reserve Bank was limited 
by the Registrar of Banks and the Banks Act which dictates which institutions can 
take deposits.  
 
“I’d say we are open to change and innovation, but we can only do it through the 
existing regulation,” explains Mitchell. (Mitchell.Interview. 22 March 2012) 
 
Comparing the South African mobile money regulatory environment to that in Kenya, 
Mitchell explains that the Kenyan regulators were not aware of the influence in and 
importance of the M-Pesa product when it was launched, signing a letter of no-
objection to allow the scheme to operate under existing regulations. However, 
Mitchell holds that the scheme “developed so fast they lost control, and are now 
playing catch-up.” (Mitchell. Interview. 22 March 2012) 
 
The Reserve Bank takes part in many international discussion fora around regulating 
mobile money and Mitchell says a popular view amongst international regulators is to 
keep the message transmission system separate from the banking system in order to 
protect the consumer.    
 
Mitchell and his team have identified a key area for development in future which he 
believes will create an enabling environment for mobile-money rollout. 
Interoperability is high on the Bank’s agenda and Mitchell says he is pushing for 
improvements. This would facilitate consumers being able to have an m-money 
account and being able to send money to a recipient no matter what service provider 
they are registered with. Similarly, users would be able to withdraw or cash-out at 
vendors or through ATM machines irrespective of the service provider.  
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“South Africa has one of the most sophisticated payment systems in the world. 
Currently we have fourteen e-money products and none of them talk to each other.” 
(Mitchell.Interview. March 22 2012) 
 
When asked what it would take to rectify the problem, Mitchell says the Payment 
Association of South Africa (PASA) would need to investigate technical standards 
and develop an appropriate payment clearing house.  
 
Mitchell says the mobile money space is in an expansion phase, but cautions that 
education remains key to promoting uptake. He says there is no denying that cash is 
still the currency of choice worldwide and this is what is known and trusted.  
 
Mitchell is aware of the criticism levelled at regulators, but says he believes this to be 
misguided.  
 
“Operators will continue to blame us. They want to be banks, but must realise they are 
message carriers, not banks.” (Mitchell. Interview. 22 March 2012) 
 
When asked for clarity around the relationship between PASA and the Reserve Bank, 
Mitchell is emphatic that, while the Reserve Bank is guided and assisted by PASA, 
ultimate power still resides with the Reserve Bank.   
 
“If they (PASA) draw up rules they must be done with our approval and sign-
off. They can’t go along and block people from the national payment system. If 
we want to let a non-bank into the payment system we can do that. PASA can 
regulate the behaviour of the members of the NPS, PASA does not regulate the 
payment system. We are ultimately in control.” (Mitchell. Interview. 22 March 
2012) 
 
When asked how the Reserve Banks sees proportionate regulation, Mitchell explains 
that the Bank will watch for developments assess the situation, waiting to see the 
uptake of a product and the needs of the market, and then act accordingly.  
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From this research we can see that there are divergent views on which factors have 
the biggest impact on the rollout and uptake of mobile services. In the following 
chapter we will unpack the findings and analyse these based on the main themes laid 
out in the literature review in order to position the research findings into the greater 
body of literature and give context to the research.  
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CHAPTER 5 Research analysis  	  
 
In this chapter I analyse the findings of the research conducted and apply those 
findings back to the themes laid out in the literature review. By searching for 
commonalities and differences of opinion, I will have a greater chance of exposing 
the issues which will answer the three supporting questions: Are current regulations 
helping or hindering the uptake of mobile money services in developing countries and 
South Africa in particular; are the business models currently being used appropriate to 
deliver services at scale; and which other factors impact the user uptake of mobile 
money services? This will allow me to fully explore the main research question in the 
conclusion. 
   
5.1 Scale – different metrics but vital none the less 
 
If one investigates the reasons why mobile money projects are not reaching scale as 
put forward by Boer and de Boer (2010) one first has to analyse what this term means 
and how it is applied to performance analysis. This presents a challenge as there is no 
clear industry standard. It is clear that when analysing the performance of mobile 
money projects across the globe, success can mean different things to different people. 
Mas and Radcliffe (2010) believe scale is met when there are at least 10 times the 
number of cash-in / cash-out outlets than there are traditional bank branches, and that 
each of these outlets should be generating at least 50 transactions per day.  
 
Van Rensburg, however sees scale as having at least 30 percent of the target market 
signed up for the services and actively making use of at least some of its functionality. 
(Van Rensburg. Interview. 8 January 2012) 
 
Hahn, on the other hand, indirectly speaks of scale when he predicts the future of 
uptake and says 
 
In cases of the true emerging market (where CSP agents outnumber bank branches 
and ATMS by 5-10x) m-payment services for things like remittance and micro-
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purchase will take hold and do well (Hahn. Personal Correspondence. 14 February 
2012) 
 
If one is simply assessing the number of users, then the Gartner findings that only five 
projects have over a million users (Moyer 2010) and that through to the end of 2012, 
70 percent of projects will attain not be in a position to report one million users, then 
the sustainability of these projects has to be questioned.  
 
Even if one is more forgiving in one’s assessment, like Van Rensburg when he refers 
to ‘spectacularly’ successful and ‘marginally’ successful projects, (Van Rensburg. 
Interview.18 January 2012) it is clear that having more consistency in how one 
measures success is necessary to conduct comparative research.   
 
5.2 Regulatory challenges 
 
 While each interviewee had different opinions about which challenges had the 
biggest impact on mobile money rollout and uptake, all of them admit that regulatory 
challenges exist.   
 
5.2.1 Challenges to getting started  
  
Understanding the regulatory environment in a new market is the first challenge 
facing a mobile money initiative. Each region has different levels of regulatory 
requirements. When Vodafone and Safaricom began their initiative in Kenya in 2007, 
they entered a market which was devoid of particular regulations pertaining to mobile 
money projects. Collins goes so far as to refer to it as a regulatory vacuum (Collins 
September 2011)  
 
In contrast, the regulatory environment in South Africa was a much more complex 
and rigid one at the advent of mobile money as pointed out by Esselaar (Esselaar. 
Personal Correspondence 11 March 2012) 
 
The very fist order of business would be for an organisation to establish if they could 
act with or without a formal banking licence. This may be simpler for a bank-led 
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model, as it would presumably already be in possession of a licence to link into the 
national payments system. Even if it were a new banking entrant it would be a lot 
easier for it to meet local requirements for banking operations, having gone through 
similar regulatory compliance in a different region.  
 
For a mobile network operator, or any other non-bank, however, it may be a very 
different experience.  
 
In South Africa, the process for starting a mobile money scheme would be further 
hampered by the strict requirements that only organisations in possession of a banking 
licence can link into the National Payment System. The non-bank would need to 
partner with a bank and this, as one can imagine, will require protracted negotiations 
and time wasted in the legal process finalising the commercial terms of engagement, 
as commented on by Burrell. (Burrell. Interview. 7 March 2012)   
 
Additional layers of regulation such as the tight exchange controls can further impede 
companies, such as experienced by Burrell when Mukuru.com sought to perform 
remittances from South Africa into other territories. (Burrell. Interview. 7 March 
2012) 
 
National policy may also hamper mobile money startups. Countries may be reluctant 
to allow foreign companies into their banking system as suggested by Esselaar in the 
case of Nigeria. (Personal Correspondence. 11 March 2012) Or, countries may be 
naturally wary of mobile money initiatives as suggested by Taylor (Interview 9 March 
2012) and may even be reluctant to relinquish control over the currency as suggested 
by Vegter. (Personal Correspondence 11 February 2012) The CGAP report (May 
2010) affirms the access to the National Payment System is restrictive and that the 
matter has not escaped the notice of the Competition Commission (Competition 
Commission 2008), although significant changes have yet to be seen.  
 
While the South African Reserve Bank has expressed the notion of keeping an open 
mind and investigating new regulatory measures, (Mitchell. Personal Correspondence 
22 March 2012) this has yet to bear fruit and the current stringent requirements of 
which entity is able to take deposits and operate an e-float remain firmly in place.   
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5.2.2 Ensuring compliance brings new challenges   	  
Once the paperwork is completed, companies will have to deal with the problems of 
ensuring compliance to the many regulations which have been put in place to mitigate 
risk.  
 
Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti money laundering / combating the finance of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) all have to be adhered to.  
 
Understanding who your customer is and being able to verify this comes at a cost - 
both in time and money. Setting up systems and databases to record details of ID 
documents takes time and costs money. These requirements have been challenged 
from time to time, and in South Africa, the frustrations of having to carry the burden 
of the KYC and AML/CFT requirements can be seen by M-Pesa banker, Nedbank 
alerting the regulator to the fact that they would be ‘interpreting’ Exemption 17 and 
Circular 6 differently as explained by Taylor. (Interview. January 16 2012) 
 
The costs associated with the KYC regulation is echoed by Ernst Van Rensburg when 
he speaks about the duplication of RICA and FICA. Balance of Payment and 
threshold requirements in South Africa adding further layers of costs as mentioned by 
Ernst Van Rensburg. (Interview. 16 January 2012) 
 
The AML regulations brings additional time and costs associated with them.  The 
frustration felt by Taylor in how the AML regulations have impeded the rollout of 
additional M-Pesa South Africa cash-in / cash-out agencies to owners who are foreign 
nationals must be significant for a company which is fighting to increase its 
distribution network. The environment in Kenya was vastly different where Safaricom 
was able to quickly and aggressively sign up its existing network of airtime resellers 
to become M-Pesa agents, including both local and foreign nationals, if they had 
reasonable documentation such as valid passport numbers. Taylor’s (interview 9 
March 2012) sentiment is validated by the CGAP report which states: 
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Vodacom clearly feels the process of understanding what constitutes a 
permissible approach to the use of agents has slowed down the launch of M-
PESA considerably. Discussions with some banks revealed that, apart from 
the uncertainty around the broad regulatory space for agents, the 
accreditation requirements being set for agents under the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act also pose a problem. CGAP (May 2010 
pg10) 
 
The frustration felt by Ernst Van Rensburg and Taylor is not isolated as can be seen 
by the references to this in the CGAP report (May 2011) where reports of similar 
frustrations from multiple service providers have been mentioned.  
 
 A second layer of regulatory complexity is added when one looks at regulating to 
protect the consumer. Regulating to protect the consumer could also incorporate many 
of the risk-based regulations such as the AML/CFT. A regulator has a duty to protect 
the consumer against the perils of misuse of the systems. If an m-money scheme is 
being used by money launderers or terrorists, it runs the risk of being shut down and 
compromising the innocent customers’ money.  
 
Additional consumer regulations have been added to the risk-based regulations and 
while, by in large, they are there to ensure integrity in the service offering, and have 
been welcomed by Ernst Van Rensburg and Burrell, they also come at administrative 
price.  
 
Quite simply, a consumer wants a service that answers a need they have – to store and 
transfer money securely and simply at a compelling price.   
 
A regulator, on the other hand, needs to protect the consumer against companies 
acting irresponsibly, and thereby putting the money of the consumer at risk.  
 
Mobile Money schemes are required to back their services with appropriate security. 
In South Africa this would include the fact that only prudentially governed banks can 
take a deposit and how the Reserve Bank has dealt with conditions on e-floats. 
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The additional compliance does two things: it acts as a deterrent to who enters the 
market, as pointed out by Vegter (Personal Correspondence 11 February 2012) and 
adds an additional level of cost as pointed out by Collins. (Interview. 6 March 2012) 
This compounds matters since the fewer players there are in the market, the lower the 
level of competition, which also has cost implications.  
 
The proportionate regulatory challenge when regulating for the consumer is summed 
up by Dias and Mckee (2010) who warn of the balance that needs to be struck when 
looking to protect the consumer.  
 
5.2.3 Overlapping regulations adding to the administrative burden 
 
M-Pesa South Africa head, Taylor (Interview 9 March 2012) says the regulatory 
challenge is further frustrated by the duplication in KYC requirements between the 
banks and the mobile network operators. He has called for one central database 
administering the details of users which can be updated by either a mobile network 
operator or banks as and when the customers’ details change. This is most clearly 
echoed by Alampay (2010) who warns that the lack of data base interoperability may 
lead to co-ordinated regulation failure, first pointed out by Porteous (2009).  There is 
no doubt however, that the current system is particularly burdensome for consumers 
who are required to keep their banks up to date with their latest details as well as their 
mobile service provider. The prospect of going through the entire process again when 
opening a mobile money account is less than appealing.  
 
It could also be argued that the roles of Reserve Bank and the Payment Association of 
South Africa (PASA) could be assigned to theme of regulatory overlap. While PASA 
is a self-regulating body and the Reserve Bank a recognised regulator, it does not 
detract from the fact that both bodies are working on rules to govern the payment 
system. 
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5.2.4 Regulating for competition or the lack thereof 
 
Ensuring mobile money competition is a challenge for regulators. They have to 
balance the need to protect the consumer, protect the integrity of the greater financial 
ecosystem, all the while trying to create an enabling environment for new entrants to 
enter the market.  
 
The growing theme when looking at regulations for competition is one of 
interoperability. This is borne out by the number of mobile money commentators who 
referenced the issue.  
 
Burrell believes interoperability will have a significant impact on the uptake of 
mobile money services. (Interview. 7 March 2012) Taylor has unsurprisingly called 
for banks to open up their systems to allow for greater interoperability. 
Interoperability would solve a number of M-Pesa’s distribution challenges and it 
could be argued that this was the reason for the soon-to-be-announced deal with VISA 
Taylor refers to. The VISA channels would effectively allow M-Pesa customers onto 
multiple platforms through the universal BIN number which VISA and the other 
global card companies make use of.  (Interview 9 March 2012) 
 
The technical challenges of interoperability are fairly high as can be seen in the 
Vodafone Qatar case study, particularly when it comes to cross-border remittances 
and the need for m-money platforms to connect to multiple payment databases in 
multiple regions, all governed by different regulatory requirements.  
 
Indeed, Dolan (2010), and Lymen et al (2008) place the need to balance competition 
and interoperability high on the future research agenda.  
 
Given the strong sentiment that interoperability is a major factor to be addressed when 
attempting to create an enabling regulatory environment, it is not surprising that the 
South African Reserve Bank has placed interoperability so high on its strategy agenda, 
proving that in this area there is consensus. Encouraging the banks to open up their 
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infrastructure to allow all players to interconnect however, may prove to be a 
challenge. The willingness of the banks to allow competition is still much debated.    
 
When analysing how to regulate for competition one has to ask the age old question: 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Who guards the guards themselves?  
 
Vegter’s bold assertion that it is in the South African banks’ interest to maintain the 
stranglehold on which company is admitted to national payment system may be 
viewed as slightly conspiratorial when he says: 
 
Traditional banks can't afford to care about the poor (to put it kindly), despite 
what they say. More likely, they don't care because they don't have to care. 
Exorbitant and sometimes extortionate fees are the price we pay for 
regulatory protection of a cartel of banking license holders. For those who 
don't earn much, that cartel offers 
nothing but dead losses. (Vegter. Personal Communication. February 11 2012) 
 
However, he is not alone in his sceptical view of the power the major banks (and 
those who have banking licences) have over the mobile money environment. Krugel 
also questions this when he asks why the members of PASA would encourage non-
banks to enter the fold of national payment system self regulators and suggests the 
system exhibits traits of an oligopoly. (Interview 19 March 2012) 
 
The very clear and unambiguous rejection of any regulatory uncertainty from the 
Reserve Bank aims to correct these perceptions when Mitchell states:  
 
“If they (PASA) draw up rules they must be done with our approval and sign-
off. They can’t go along and block people from the national payment system. If 
we want to let a non-bank into the payment system we can do that. PASA can 
regulate the behaviour of the members of the NPS, PASA does not regulate the 
payment system. We are ultimately in control.” (Mitchell. Personal 
Correspondence 22 March 2012) 
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This is again countered by the more moderate, but still critical, view of Collins who 
points out the Reserve Bank is geared to act on behalf of the banks rather than 
creating an environment to allow new entrants into the market.  
 
“The Reserve Bank’s role is not to be an innovator. It is a partner of the established 
banks,” (Collins. Personal Correspondence 6 March 2012) 
5.2.5 Summing up the regulatory environment  	  	  
Part of the purpose of the research was to establish the effects regulations have had on 
the uptake of mobile money services. While all of the interviewees agreed that the 
regulatory regime in a region had an impact on mobile money uptake, the degree of 
impact was given different levels of importance by individuals.  
 
Van Rensburg dismisses the regulatory regime has having a major effect on the 
uptake.  
 
If something goes wrong in a smaller country it’s more easily contained than 
if it goes wrong in a big country like India. People are blaming regulations 
and it’s not that in most countries, in most countries regulations are not the 
problem – not even close. (Van Rensburg. Personal Correspondence. 18 
January 2012) 
 
Esselaar acknowledges the complexity of the regulatory environment in South Africa, 
but says it has not significantly hindered the delivery and uptake of mobile money. 
(Personal Correspondence. 11 March 2012) 
 
Ernst Van Rensburg and Burrell both acknowledge the need for strict regulations, 
with Burrell welcoming the stricter regulations in South Africa. Ernst Van Rensburg 
believes regulations are there for a reason, but cautions that South African regulations 
to protect the currency have made the revenue pie smaller.  
 
Others such as Collins and Vegter believe the regulatory environment is the main 
reason why mobile services are not delivering.  
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The overly-cautious, regulatory driven bank-led approach has all but killed off 
the possibility of producing an MPESA-like agile, cheap, customer-friendly 
mobile money application or solutions built around the requirements that sub-
Saharan African customers so desperately need. This has had profound effects 
on the pace of mobile money adoption. Collins (September 2011) 
 
Taylor (Interview. 9 March 2012) points out that it’s not the level of regulation that is 
the problem, it is the lack of clarity of the regulations and this and calls for a simpler 
regulatory regime. Krugel is also of the opinion that the lack of clarity around South 
African regulations adds a layer of complexity to the regulatory environment. 
(Interview. 19 March 2012)  
 
The findings suggest there is no consensus as to the effect regulations have on the 
uptake of mobile money services. While many are in favour of simpler and clearer 
regulations, some simply dismiss the effect of regulations, believing the issues lie 
elsewhere.  	  
5.3 How have the business models affected delivery and uptake of mobile 
money? 
 
There has been much debate about whether a bank-led or an MNO-led model is more 
likely to reach scale. The spectacular success of the MNO-led model in the case of 
Kenya’s M-Pesa would seem to point to the fact that this is the model of choice.  
 
However, this simplistic notion is countered by Sutherland who argues that it is not 
within the core competencies of the mobile operators to deliver and believes the banks 
in South Africa can adequately fill the needs gap.  
 
Collins supports Sutherland’s notion saying the MNOs are happy to leave the 
business of banking to the banks and are content with the revenues derived from the 
data traveling over the network. (Personal Correspondence. 15 November 2011)   
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Esselaar, meanwhile, says in instances where there is a low level of existing banking 
infrastructure, the simpler, MNO-led model is the best suited to deliver. (Personal 
Correspondence 11 March 2012) 
 
Hahn, however, believes the consumer is not particularly interested in who delivers 
the services and sees no clear indication of which model is preferable. (Hahn. 
Personal Correspondence 2012) 
 
Similarly, Van Rensburg is of the opinion that the question of who leads the initiative 
is of little import. Indeed, Fundamo has been involved in rollouts using every 
conceivable business model and Van Rensburg dismisses the importance of the model 
by saying:  
 
It doesn't really matter. In South Africa the banks are successful. In West 
Africa the operators are. I think it’s unnecessary argument. It should be about 
how am I taking this to market, do I have good management, do I have good 
controls in place?  And am I doing it in the right way? That is the problem, 
there are not enough skills to roll out these projects. (Van Rensburg. Personal 
Correspondence. 18 January 2012) 
 
5.3.1 Which business issues are affecting uptake? 
 
Heyer and Mas (2010) put forward a framework to assess business models in the 
mobile money environment. According to the authors, the key characteristics of 
success are ‘volume, speed and coverage’. The research analysis that follows is 
applied to this framework. 
 
Volume  
 
A common theme from the interviews has been the importance of remittances to 
achieving volume.  
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Both Ernst Van Rensburg and Burrell (Interview 7 March 2012) are clear on the 
importance of remittance in developing volume for services. Indeed, both their 
businesses are built on the premise. Ernst Van Rensburg holds that the regulations in 
South Africa are hindering the uptake of remittances and hence the volume (and 
profitability) of businesses in the mobile money space is impacted. (Interview January 
16 2012) 
 
Hahn pegs the future of the South African mobile payment market on cross-border 
remittances and says the regulations governing money flow across borders should be 
lowered to allow the growth of remittances to and from the country. (Personal 
Correspondence 14 February 2012) 
 
Speed 
 
Heyer and Mas’ second prerequisite, speed, can be described as how quickly mobile 
money operators can sign up members onto the system and get them transacting. This 
fits into the chicken-and-egg trap referred to by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) who 
similarly examined challenges to uptake.  
 
M-Pesa South Africa has been plagued by the slow signup of users onto its network. 
The CEO of Vodacom, Pieter Uys (My Broadband June 19, 2011) acknowledges that 
the company has been targeting the wrong consumers when it launched – black rural, 
unbanked women – and says this will shift going forward.  
 
Taylor confirms the new strategy to increase sign-up and apart from the deal with 
Visa, the company has made every effort to tap into other networks through 
competitions with large brands with established local footprints such as Coca Cola, 
South African Breweries and Sasko. (Interview. 9 March 2012) This demonstrates the 
importance of marketing when trying to grow the network.  
 
An additional attempt to increase the speed of sign-up is ensuring the access to utility 
payments. These efforts have been designed to bring into effect the network effect 
described by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) which states the value of joining a network is 
directly proportional to those already on the network.  
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This network effect and the chicken-and-egg tap, as put forward Mas and Radcliffe 
(2010) have also been raised by Van Rensburg when he states scale requires at least 
30 percent of the target market signing up for the service and using it frequently. 
(Interview. 8 January 2012) 
 
An additional business driver is the nature of the existing infrastructure. This can 
include the mobile penetration existing in the country, as well as the existing banking 
channels.  
 
Coverage  
 
Heyer and Mas’ third requirement, coverage, is a further dilemma when assessing 
business models. In order for a mobile money service to reach scale and deliver on the 
network effect, consumers need to be able to sign up and access cash-in / cash-out 
outlets in their own communities. This distribution challenge is something many of 
the interviewees alluded to.  
 
Sutherland believes M-Pesa Kenya’s success was due to the existing Safaricom 
market dominance and penetration. Making use of the existing airtime agents, the 
company was able to quickly roll out services to cover the country. (Interview 15 
November 2011) 
 
Ernst Van Rensburg points out that Sable actively seeks to partner with companies 
which already have an establish distribution model as this augers well for a successful 
implementation, if one holds with the framework put forward by Heyer and Mas 
(2010) 
 
Collins believes the mobile network operators in developing countries have a natural 
advantage over the banks as their distribution model is generally more established. 
(Interview 6 March 2012)  
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Taylor’s frustration with the AML regulations is driven by his understanding that M-
Pesa South Africa needs to bolster its distribution model by increasing the number of 
agents it has access to. (Interview. 9 March 2012) 
 
Esselaar holds that the mobile network companies have the advantage as they already 
have access to the distribution network through the agents deployed. (Personal 
Correspondence 2012) 
 
Trust 
 
One element which is not included in the framework put forward by Heyer and Mas 
(2010) is trust. This is, however, included in the analysis framework put forward by 
Mas and Radcliffe (2010) and, since many of the interviewees have referred to trust as 
an issue to be considered, it is worthwhile to include this in the analysis. 
 
The business model assessment framework put forward by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) 
speaks of the need for trust. Consumers need to trust the product they have been 
offered.  
 
This is echoed by many of the interviewees who feel trust can be a difficult hurdle to 
overcome for new entrants into the market.  
 
Esselaar believes it was distrust in the banks in Nigeria which led to the Mobile 
Network Operators to successfully enter the market. He says consumers were used to 
the services offered by the MNOs and opted to put their trust in the operators rather 
than the banks. (Personal Correspondence 11 March 2012) 
 
Hahn agrees that trust is hurdle which mobile money service providers need to 
overcome, but believes there is no great differentiator between the trust in banks and 
MNOs.  
“Who do users hate more than banks? Maybe the telco is the only 
competition! So this is a race to the bottom in some ways. I don’t have a 
strong sense that Communication Service Provider-led m-payment services 
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are well received as alternatives to bank-led services. It’s more a question of 
extending service to folks who never had a bank account.” (Hahn. Personal 
Communication 14 February 2012). 
 
5.4 What other issues are impacting the uptake of mobile money services? 	  	  
The models put forward by the likes of Mas and Radcliffe (2010), Heyer and Mas 
(2010) and others go a long way to analysing factors impacting uptake of mobile 
money. However, they do not make allowance for factors external to the business 
models and regulatory environment. If the mobile money ecosystem is to be viewed 
holistically, one must include other factors.  
These include the social and political situations in various regions. Issues such as 
culture, user education and awareness of the product must be included.  
 
Van Rensburg gives these issues consideration when he agrees that education and 
awareness are hurdles to be overcome. (Interview. 18 January 2012)  
 
Bhan takes the holistic view that factors such as the social circumstances of customers 
need to be taken into account. She goes on to state that social issues are critical at the 
outset and that designers of the product should be using this as the starting point when 
designing a new product.     
 
In my opinion, everyday user centred designers who work in innovation know 
nothing about what they will create or what will emerge, but they start by 
understanding people and their needs and operating environment and 
challenges and constraints and then attempt to develop solutions that fit those 
criteria. Lowers the barriers to adoption if you start by looking for what the 
end user needs rather than what will benefit the company or the banks, no? 
(Bhan. Personal Correspondence 6 March 2012) 
 
This view is supported by Mas and Morawczynski (2009) who call a service offering 
which is simple to use and which has a simple user interface in order to appeal to the 
less technically sophisticated market and the lower educated markets.  
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Taylor agrees that education is a stumbling point for M-Pesa South Africa and is 
looking to address this through marketing. (Interview 9 March 2012) 
 
Political issues may also play a part. While political unrest is generally bad for 
business, Burrell points out that the post-election riots in Kenya worked in favour of 
M-Pesa Kenya and that the success can, in part, be put down to the timing of these 
riots with the launch of the service. (Interview. 7 March 2012) 
 
The culmination of all these issues is referenced by Sutherland when he suggests that 
the success of M-Pesa can be attributed to a combination of all these issues in a 
perfect storm which may never be repeated. (Interview. 15 November 2011) 
 
The one factor raised by both Van Rensburg and Krugel, and which fell outside any 
of the findings in the readings included in the literature review, was the issue of skills.  
 
Both Van Rensburg and Krugel bemoan the lack of skills in the management of 
mobile money. Van Rensburg says this is the single biggest issue facing the 
successful implementation of mobile money services globally.  
 
I think a key problem is that it’s not always the A-Team that gets to do the 
work. So, for instance I am running an MNO in country X, I have challenges, I 
have to distribute prepaid airtime, my network is under strain. Then they are 
told they have to do the mobile money product as well… they look for the most 
available person, not the best person to do the rollout. So if you don’t have the 
A-Team working on the project you are going to have B-Team results. And in 
many instances that’s the case. (Van Rensburg. Personal Correspondence. 18 
January 2012) 
 
Krugel echoes this saying the lack of basic business management is holding back the 
successful delivery of services and references his own findings of working with 
mobile money implementations across the globe.  
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I have visited nine mobile money initiatives in the last four months and I have 
been flabbergasted at who is running them.  It is not bankers, or even 
experienced business people. It is middle management IT guys. Given that 
between six and fifteen percent of an MNO revenue could be derived from a 
successful mobile money offering, this makes no sense. One company was 
launching a national product with three fulltime employees to oversee this. 
The real reason mobile money schemes are not reaching scale is the lack of 
allocation of appropriate resources to build and lead the business. (Krugel. 
Personal correspondence. 19 March 2012) 
 
While this notion of skills as factor in the uptake of mobile money has not yet made 
an appearance in peer-reviewed literature on the topic, it is an important finding. Both 
Van Rensburg and Krugel work for Fudamo, a company which has global experience 
dealing with multiple business models and multiple regulatory environments. Krugel 
has also had a number of years experience working at the GSMA, a global body 
recognised for its insight and research into mobile money. It is reasonable to assume 
both Van Rensburg and Krugel have more than enough on-the-ground experience to 
make their findings both significant and relevant.  
 
5.5 Research findings 
 
The body of work around why (with a few exceptions), mobile money schemes have 
not reached scale points to many reasons. Some such as Porteous, (2009) Merritt 
(2010) and Alampay (2010) have pointed to the regulatory environment, while others 
such as Mas and Radcliffe (2010) and Heyer and Mas (2010) are looking more 
closely at the business models and how they are impacting user uptake.  
 
Similarly, those interviewed for this research have different ideas as to what the 
biggest factor impacting the rollout and user uptake of services is.  
 
Some are convinced regulations need to be relaxed to allow for easier entry into the 
mobile money space. Others believe the business issues need to take precedence.  
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It is interesting that three of the interviewees, all of whom are not directly involved in 
the mobile money industry, but who make it their business to analyse the environment, 
believe the reason for uptake of services depends on needs of the consumer.  
 
When Hahn predicts the future performance he clearly puts forward the idea that the 
needs of the users will ultimately determine the uptake of services. (Interview 14 
February 2012)  
 
Fellow analyst, Goldtsuck puts forward a similar position saying: 
I think the key issue is that mobile money services target the wrong need. The 
purveyors of mobile money argue from a self-interest point of view, and tend 
to blame external factors for lack of take-up, when it is in fact a structural 
issue, namely that the needs met by mobile money are already being met by 
other means. (Goldstuck. Personal Correspondence. 2 March 2012) 
Bhan echoes both when she puts forward her recommendation for companies offering 
products to first understand the needs of the consumer.  
 
In my opinion, everyday user centred designers who work in innovation know 
nothing about what they will create or what will emerge, but they start by 
understanding people and their needs and operating environment and 
challenges and constraints and then attempt to develop solutions that fit those 
criteria. Lowers the barriers to adoption if you start by looking for what the 
end user needs rather than what will benefit the company or the banks, no? 
(Bhan. Personal Correspondence 6 March 2012) 
 
It may be argued that in order to better understand the factors which impact the 
delivery and uptake of mobile money services in developing countries, particularly in 
South Africa – as required by the main research question – we should rather use a 
needs-based assessment framework.  
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In the following chapter I examine the overall findings of the research and assess 
which factors are impacting the uptake of mobile money services as required by the 
main research question.  
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and areas for future research 
 
Mobile money initiatives are being rolled out across the globe in increasing numbers. 
Despite this apparent indication that mobile money services are a good business 
proposition, (why else would companies be investing in them?), the user uptake does 
not appear to reflect the industry optimism.  
 
The research conducted has been designed to better understand what factors impact 
the rollout and uptake of mobile money services. The objective of this is to assess if 
regulations are impeding the uptake, or if there are other factors which are adding to 
challenge of reaching scale. By better understanding to what extent the contributing 
factors are impacting user uptake, regulators will be in a better position to understand 
how they should be regulating the mobile money space.  
 
6.1 To what extent have regulations impacted the rollout of m-money services? 	  	  
We can see from the research that regulations have an impact on rollout and uptake of 
mobile money services. While the extent of the effect is debated, most of those 
interviewed have agreed that regulations do have part to play in the performance of 
the mobile money scheme.  
 
6.1.1 The cost of regulations on mobile money operations 
 
Companies wishing to operate mobile money services are doing so because they see a 
business gap in the market and wish to fill it. They are not acting as charitable 
organisations and margins and profits will be built into the costing models.  
 
Many of the interviewees have argued that the administrative burden of complying to 
regulations increase in a heavily regulated environment and put forward the notion 
that this increases the cost of delivering services.  
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In South Africa, the costs of compliance can be seen from the outset. A company may 
not take deposits unless they have a banking licence. This forces companies wishing 
to deliver services to work with an institution which has a licence.  
 
The cost of negotiating these deals, the time and expense of the legal teams as well as 
the delays while negotiating all impact the business value proposition. The longer it 
takes to set up, the more costs are incurred. Revenues will need to be shared between 
the licence holder and the mobile operator resulting in profit dilution.  
 
Setting up systems to ensure compliance adds a further layer of costs. Stricter KYC 
requirements call for more sophisticated databases and equipment to record details of 
the customer.  
 
Similarly, the conditions placed on operators to comply with AML/CFT regulations 
also call for sophisticated tracking and reporting tools.  
 
In a regulatory environment such as South Africa, a mobile money operator will need 
to ensure that their own IT systems link up to that of the partner bank. This integration 
will have to be designed and built into the original systems and maintained over time. 
This is further exacerbated by the duplication of regulations. The FICA and RICA 
requirements in South Africa each calls for separate reporting platforms and 
integration – this all adds to the costs of delivery.  
 
The lack of clarity on regulations can add an additional layer of cost. As pointed out 
by Taylor, the lack of absolute clarity of the Exemption 17 and Circular 6 regulations 
has taken the M-Pesa South Africa partners two years to address and he argues this 
has held up aggressive rollout. (Interview. 9 March 2012) 
 
Many authors, and those interviewed for this research, point to the fact that the key 
factor working in favour of M-Pesa Kenya was that Safaricom entered the market 
with very little regulatory burden. The company was able to quickly rollout out 
services without the distraction of dealing extensively with the central bank, rather 
focusing their time on the crucial element of marketing the services. Having fewer 
regulations to deal with also meant Safaricom had to incur fewer costs dealing with 
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the regulations and this leaves more operating capital to spend on building the 
networks, incentivising the agents to sign up users and advertising to grow awareness 
of the product.  
 
6.1.2 Regulating for accessibility  
 
It can be argued that regulations can impede the accessibility of the mobile services. 
Ensuring accessibility is crucial if a mobile money service is to flourish. Indeed, if the 
service is not available in the rural areas, part of the attractiveness of the offering – 
ubiquitous service – becomes redundant.  
 
Regulations can impact the rollout of the agent network. Taylor explains how the 
AML requirements in South Africa have impeded the sign-up of agents. Many of the 
small store owners are foreign nationals, excluding them from the network and taking 
them out of the possible on-the-ground representation in many of the places which 
would otherwise be ideal to add to the M-Pesa distribution clout. (Interview. 9 March 
2012) 
 
In a reversal of the problem faced by MNOs wishing to deliver mobile services, banks 
wishing to rollout a mobile money offering may be forced to partner with a MNO to 
tap into their distribution network. This has all the associated hindrances of the 
regulatory overlap described in MNO-led model.  
 
6.1.3 Regulating for trust  	  	  
A potential mobile money customer must be sure they can deposit their money with a 
service provider and know that they will be able to access that money again. They 
need to trust that there are enough checks and balances in the system to protect them. 
The average user however does not understand the complex rules to put in place 
protect them – this is the role of the regulator.  
 
A regulator needs to ensure the integrity of the financial system as a whole as well as 
the integrity of each individual service provider within the financial ecosystem.  
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This is achieved by regulating which entity can handle money and how they make 
provision to back the offering. Regulations in South Africa around the e-float and the 
national payment system have been roundly criticised by some players saying they are 
overly burdensome. This strict regulatory environment may dissuade MNOs from 
venturing into the market and may also discourage new entrants. Indeed, Vegter 
points out how the strict regulations including those of the Banks Act in South Africa 
are discouraging small, innovative and low-cost services from entering the market.  
 
From the research, we can see that regulations have an impact on rollout and user 
uptake. Time, managerial attention, technical and compliance considerations add to 
the cost of delivering the service and the time it takes to deliver it. These have to be 
factored into the costing models of the services and, ultimately, will impact the value 
proposition of the offering. For the developing world, where businesses are already 
struggling to position the value of the offering, this must have serious consequences.   
 
6.2 How have business models impacted the uptake of m-money services? 
 
 
Delivering mobile money services comes with complex business challenges, most 
especially in the developing world. The average user in the developed world might be 
expected to have a reasonable existing experience of mobile applications as well as e-
commerce. Making the jump from using an ATM or a computer to transact over a 
mobile phone would not be large.  
 
In the developing world however, mobile money services are being delivered to a 
market which may not have the technical and financial literacy afforded a user in the 
developed world. These inhibitors need to factored into the solution and overcome 
through various means.  
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6.2.1 The cost of doing business  
 
As we have seen, rolling out a ubiquitous mobile money service comes at a significant 
cost. The infrastructure required is extensive. Service providers need a robust and 
stable mobile network to reach the end user, management systems to ensure 
compliance and adequate systems security.  
 
Added to this is the requirement for an extensive network of agents to enable cash-in / 
cash-out functionality. Agents need to be incentivised to join the service and also 
further incentivised to encourage user sign-up and regular use of the services.  
 
Companies also need to factor in the costs of adverting and marketing in order to 
drive user uptake. This cannot be done incrementally, but has to be done on a large 
scale and across the country to ensure the network effect as described by Mas and 
Radcliffe (2010).  
 
 6.2.2 The business of accessibility  	  
 
Building a mobile money scheme which is accessible to the users requires careful 
analysis of the how to ensure services reach as many users as possible as quickly as 
possible. These challenges of the network affect and the chicken-and-egg trap as 
described by Mas and Radcliffe (2010) are acknowledged by the many players in the 
field including Van Rensburg when describing what constitutes scale and Taylor 
when he describes the difficulty of building the agent network by M-Pesa South 
Africa.  
 
M-Pesa Kenya managed this fairly quickly and this has often been attributed to the 
project’s success.  
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6.2.3 The business of trust  
 
Instilling trust in a service which is being delivered over a new medium and to a user-
base which may not have ever had access to a financial product, are culturally 
distrustful of the service and who have little financial or technical literacy is clearly 
very challenging.  
 
Overcoming the issues of trust require intensive attention and investment. Awareness 
campaigns need to take place across the country making use of every available 
channel including electronic and print media. It also requires simple, effective 
messaging to ensure the value proposition is understood and accepted. M-Pesa South 
Africa admitted it got this wrong and is shifting how it messages and to whom.  
 
When one regulates for trust, assuring the integrity of the delivery mechanism is key. 
When communicating to the end-user, the business of trust, however, must include the 
affirmation of the integrity of the business value proposition. As Bahn correctly 
pointed out, the end-users are not looking for handouts and the dignity of the 
customer must be taken into account when communicating the value proposition and 
instilling trust in the offering. (Personal Correspondence. 6 March 2012) 
 
From the research it is clear that the business models designed to deliver mobile 
money services may not be wholly appropriate. The challenges of encouraging users 
to sign up require further attention. M-Pesa South Africa openly admits that it got it 
wrong the first time around. This despite the wealth of previous findings from many 
other projects in many other regions, not least of which was its namesake in Kenya. 
At the very least, one can deduce that much work is still required to better understand 
the complex needs of users and to engineer business models which answer those 
needs more appropriately as so correctly highlighted by Hahn, Goldstuck and Bhan 
(interviews 14 February, 6 March and personal correspondence 2 March) 
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6.3 Other factors impacting the uptake of mobile money services 
 
The socio-political factors impacting the uptake of mobile money services are far 
harder to quantify than the business and regulatory factors. Issues such as the levels of 
financial and technical literacy are developmental issues which differ from region to 
region. While most of the interviewees have readily acknowledged the impact of these 
factors, they have taken a back seat to the more pressing and immediate issues of 
regulations and business models. This is not surprising since it could be argued these 
issues are beyond the control of the companies rolling out mobile money services. 
Developmental issues of countries could be improved, but this is generally in the 
realm of national policy as it pertains to basic education. The South African 
government has made attempts to address financial literacy through the Financial 
Sector Charter, but the efficacy of this lies beyond the direct control of the mobile 
money service providers. This increases the challenge for operators, although some of 
the marketing initiatives have attempted to address this.  
 
6.3.1 How do skills impact the uptake of mobile money services? 
 
One of the factors falling outside the traditional frameworks of regulations and 
business is the issue of skills as raised by Van Rensburg and Krugel. (Interviews. 8 
January and 19 March 2012) 
 
This issue raises a challenge for the analysis as it straddles two areas.  First, it lies in 
the area of socio-political issues since it deals with education. Van Rensburg bemoans 
the fact that the formal education system has not appropriately catered for the creation 
of the required skills in the industry (Interview 8 January 2012) 
 
The lack of appropriate skills can also be assigned to the area of business challenges. 
As both Krugel and Van Rensburg point out, companies rolling out m-money services 
seem to assign the management of the operations to people who are ill-equipped to 
deal with the operational and business requirements. Van Rensburg speaks of the ‘B-
Team’ results delivered by second choice teams assigned to deliver on some projects. 
Bronwen	  Kausch	   	   110	  
(Interview 8 January 2012) Krugel similarly refers to “…the lack of allocation of 
appropriate resources to build and lead the business.” (Interview 9 March 2012) 
 
If Van Rensburg and Krugel are correct, it begs the question of just how invested 
MNOs and banks are in mobile money projects in the first place. Hahn may have 
pointed out a key issue when he said: 
 
They’re (the banks) in it, maybe for similar reasons that Vodacom is doing the 
SA version of M-Pesa. They are trying some things but I had no sense that it 
was full steam ahead, we know what we want…I think the MNOs are playing 
rather defensively, not wanting to be left out in case something takes off. 
(Hahn. Personal Correspondence. 14 February 2012) 
It is clear from the research that not only are the effects of these difficult to quantify, 
but that there is still much to be learned, particularly in the areas of skills.  
 
6.4 The assessment  
 
When trying to assess the factors impacting the rollout and uptake of mobile money 
services it becomes clear that regulations, business issues and socio-political issues 
are closely interwoven. It is almost impossible to separate them as they impact each 
other. 
 
For the regulator, this makes things very difficult. The ‘regulator’s dilemma’ as 
pointed out by Dias and McKee (2010) is very apparent in this instance. The call for 
proportional regulation by authors such as Porteous (2009), Merritt (2010) and 
Alampay (2010) is made significantly more difficult when we understand how 
complex the issues affecting user uptake really are.  
 
It is clear the South African Reserve Bank has a tough road ahead.  They should be 
commended for their ‘open minded’ attitude when tackling the problems of regulating 
for mobile money uptake (Mitchell. Interview. 22 March). Indeed, from this research 
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we can see Dias and McKee’s (2010) call for a balance between regulation 
proportionality and efficacy may still be a way off.  
 
6.5 Areas for future research and recommendations 	  
6.5.1 Areas for future research 
 
While many of the research findings reflect the general themes of the literature review, 
the anomaly raised by Van Rensburg and Krugel raise interesting new issues. The 
lack of appropriate skills in mobile money industry deserves further attention and 
research for the following reasons: 
 
1. To better understand the impact this is having on mobile money projects  
 
2. If it is impacting services, to find ways to address the issue through the 
creation of skills transfer, appropriate education initiatives and the possible 
industry intervention suggested by Van Rensburg (Interview 8 January 2012) 
 
3. To fully understand the serious issue this highlights of just how important 
mobile money projects really are to both banks and mobile network operators. 
If, as Hahn suggests, (Personal correspondence 14 February 2012) both are 
merely making sure they are involved and biding their time until m-money 
services really become revenue drivers, then regulators should be considering 
how to enable small, innovative start-ups and allow them to deliver services.  
 
6.5.2 Recommendations for m-money operators 
 
While this research does not come to a definitive answer as to why mobile money 
schemes are still not reaching scale, it highlights the challenges facing mobile money 
operators and suggests factors they should be aware of when building solutions best 
suited for success. These include ensuring they develop business models which 
address the challenges of user uptake, including user awareness, levels of financial 
literacy and their real and relevant needs.  
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Operators should also be mindful of the regulatory challenges they will have to 
address as well as the possible difficulty of breaking into markets which are heavily 
regulated.  
 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
 
Finally, mobile operators should give careful thought to which skills they assign to 
manage the delivery of mobile services. From this research we can see the complexity 
of designing and delivering a sustainable mobile money service offering. If operators 
are truly serious about delivering a successful operation, finding and assigning the 
right team may be the most important decision they make.   
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Appendix A Baseline questionnaire  	  	  
1. In your opinion, have regulations negatively impacted the mobile money space in 
South Africa? 
 
2. Do you think a light-touch regulatory environment assisted roll out of m-money 
services in other developing countries?  
 
3. Do you think the business models being used are impacting the uptake of m-money 
services in developing countries, and if so, how? 
 
4. What impact do issues such as marketing, user education, literacy and cultural 
mistrust of formal financial services have on the uptake of m-money services in the 
developing world?  
 
5. Do you think m-money services will gain momentum in South Africa and, if so, 
what will be the catalyst/s that will stimulate the growth?  
 
6. How important are m-money offerings to the banks in South Africa? 
 
7. How important are m-money offerings to the Mobile Network Operators in South 
Africa? 
 
8. What is your outlook for m-money services in the developing world and South 
Africa in particular? 
